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Mergers and acquisitions are a fast way for a firm to grow. Using plant-level data, we examine how
firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions. We find that there is a large amount of restructuring
in a short period following mergers. Acquirers sell 27% and close 19% of acquired plants within three
years of the acquisition. Plants in the target's peripheral divisions, especially in industries in which
asset values are increasing, and in industries in which the acquirer does not have a comparative advantage,
are more likely to be sold by the acquirer. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions
tend to retain more acquired plants. Plants retained by acquirers increase in productivity whereas sold
plants do not. The extent of post-merger restructuring activities and their cross-sectional variation
do not support an empire building explanation for mergers. Acquirers readjust their firm boundaries
in ways that are consistent with the exploitation of their comparative advantage across industries.
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Mergers and acquisitions are a fast way for a ￿rm to grow and recon￿gure its asset portfolio.1 Through
mergers ￿rms frequently acquire portfolios of assets spanning several industries. After the merger, the
acquiring ￿rm faces decisions on how to redraw its boundaries by keeping some newly acquired assets
and selling or closing others. At one end of the spectrum, the acquiring ￿rm may match the assets
it retains to its ability, keeping only assets which it can operate e¢ ciently and selling o⁄ or closing the
remainder. At the other extreme, in mergers motivated by pure empire building, the acquirer may decide
to retain all its newly acquired assets. Although how the ￿rm redraws its boundaries may a⁄ect the long
run productivity of the retained assets and their value, little is known about the extent and outcomes of
post-merger restructuring.
In this paper, we analyze whether ￿rms retain, close, or sell o⁄ the assets acquired in a merger and
characterize the productive e¢ ciency of retained and sold o⁄ assets. We start by showing that acquiring
￿rms do not passively retain the assets acquired in a merger. Rather, the merger starts a vigorous restruc-
turing that involves a signi￿cant number of sello⁄s and closures of the target ￿rm￿ s assets. We examine
two related questions about the post-merger restructuring process. First, are acquirers more likely to keep
certain assets than others? Second, are decisions to retain assets consistent with acquirers￿exploiting their
comparative advantage? To answer these questions we examine the cross-sectional variation of the plant
retention, closure, and sales decisions of acquirers and characterize the changes in productive e¢ ciency of
kept and sold plants over a short time period of three years after merger completion. Our study extends
our knowledge of post-merger restructuring beyond the (very) long term ￿rm divestitures after merger that
are examined by Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and Porter (1987).
Our sample comprises 1,483 mergers completed between 1981 and 2000 in which the target ￿rm operates
at least one plant in manufacturing (SIC codes 2000-3999). We use data from the Longitudinal Research
Database (LRD), maintained by the Center for Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census. The LRD
database contains plant-level data for manufacturing plants. The plant-level coverage means that we can
track plant performance even as they change owners or are closed down. This tracking is key to our study
as it allows us to look inside each acquisition and to identify individual plants that change hands each
year after the merger. We benchmark each plant￿ s performance against comparable plants in the same
industry and also examine how operating margins and productivity change in the post-merger period for
both kept and sold plants.
We ￿nd that in mergers, the acquisition of the target￿ s assets is merely the ￿rst step in the process
1There is a vast literature on mergers. See Andrade, Mitchell and Sta⁄ord (2001)) for a survey, and Betton, Eckbo, and
Thorburn (2007) for a more recent perspective.
1of rede￿ning ￿rm boundaries. In the typical merger, an acquirer does not passively absorb all the target
plants obtained in the merger. Instead, a merger is quickly followed by a period of vigorous restructuring
of target assets that signi￿cantly impacts the boundaries of the acquiring ￿rm. Within three years after
the completion of an acquisition, 27% of plants are sold and 19% are closed down, leaving the acquirer
with about half the plants that are initially obtained in an acquisition.
The readjustment of ￿rm boundaries after acquisitions varies cross-sectionally in ways that are con-
sistent with the view that acquirers exploit their comparative advantage across industries. We ￿nd that
acquirers are more likely to retain plants of ￿rms they purchase if they already operate a plant in the same
industry and acquirers are particularly likely to retain purchased plants that add to their largest divisions.
Plants in the target￿ s peripheral divisions, which are less likely to be the object of the acquisition, are
signi￿cantly more likely to be sold. These ￿ndings suggest that even when acquirers buy whole ￿rms, they
are ex-ante interested in a subset of the target ￿rm￿ s assets.
Furthermore, we ￿nd that acquirers are more likely to retain acquired plants if the pre-merger pro-
ductivity of plants in their own peripheral segments is high. Low productivity of existing peripheral
segments/plants indicates that a ￿rm is likely to already be beyond its optimal size, while high peripheral
plant productivity indicates that the ￿rm has the capacity to absorb and run new operations. The e⁄ect
of the marginal plant productivity is economically signi￿cant. A one standard deviation increase in the
productivity of the acquirer￿ s own marginal plants increases the probability that the acquirer retains a
newly acquired target plant by 17 to 19%. Moreover, the this e⁄ect increases to 39% in industries that
experience a positive return shock, consistent with neoclassical theories of ￿rm scope based on comparative
advantage.
We also examine the performance of plants transferred in acquisitions. We use two measures of operating
performance: the change in the industry-adjusted operating margin of the plant as well as the change in
its total factor productivity in the three year period following mergers. We ￿nd that the plants kept by
the acquirer show signi￿cant increases in productivity. In contrast, the productivity of sold plants tends
to be ￿ at. The kept plants show more improvement in performance for ￿rms that are skilled in running
their peripheral businesses, consistent with neoclassical merger theories in which ￿rms acquire businesses
in a manner that exploits their comparative advantage. Firms sell plants in areas in which they do not
have a comparative advantage. Consistent with the neoclassical view, this e⁄ect is more pronounced when
there are industry shocks that alter the opportunity costs that ￿rms face in operating assets.
While the above deals with the disposition of target plants after an acquisition, a related question is
how acquirers dispose of their own assets in the short period after a merger. Unconditionally, we ￿nd that
acquirers close and sell their own plants at higher rates than their industry benchmarks but that these rates
are lower than the disposal rates of target plants. These post-merger di⁄erences in the rates of disposal of
acquirer- and target-owned plants are driven by di⁄erences in plant characteristics. Controlling for plant
characteristics, we ￿nd no evidence that prior ownership status matters. Thus acquirers in our sample do
2not sell and close target plants at higher rate just because they belonged to the target rather than the
acquirer. We also examine the changes in productive e¢ ciency of plants that were owned by the acquirer
prior to the merger. Once again, we ￿nd an asymmetry in plant performance between kept and sold plants.
The plants owned by the acquirer prior to the acquisition improve in performance while sold plants tend
to be ￿ at or have slight decreases in performance over three years after an acquisition. In addition, in each
case we compare the plant performance with our, counterfactual, estimate of the performance that would
have been observed had the acquirer picked the unchosen disposal decision. We ￿nd little evidence that
the observed retention decisions are ine¢ cient.
Evidence from event studies suggests that the acquisition announcement e⁄ects depend on whether
the acquisition is for stock or for cash. We examine whether the use of stock explains post-merger re-
structuring or its productivity outcomes. We ￿nd that the method of ￿nancing is statistically insigni￿cant
and economically negligible and remains so when we instrument for stock acquisitions. Thus, we ￿nd
no evidence that the method of payment is predictive of future uneconomic decisions. We also ￿nd no
evidence that the operating performance of acquired plants is higher when the parties to the merger have
similar market-to-book ratios. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of industry concentration ratios
and industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
We conduct additional tests to examine the disposition decisions of repeat acquirers, who may be
particularly disposed towards empire building. If so, we might expect to see particularly ine¢ cient retention
decisions associated with low performance or retained plants in this sub-sample. We ￿nd little evidence of
these ine¢ ciencies. In fact, disposition rather than retention is more likely for repeat acquirers.
In sum, our evidence suggests that at the operational level the deployment and disposal of assets
by acquirers is broadly consistent with neoclassical theories of the scope of ￿rms such as Lucas (1978)
and Maksimovic and Phillips (MP) (2002).2 These theories emphasize the role of marginal returns and
opportunity costs in determining the boundaries of the ￿rm. Firms retain assets in which they have a
comparative advantage in operations, but sell assets that they do not have a comparative advantage in
or assets are peripheral to their operations, especially when the market price of such assets is high. The
evidence is less consistent with empire building motivations for mergers in which acquisitions are driven
by pure taste for ￿rm size. Of course, the results do not preclude other types of agency problems. For
example, acquirers may waste resources by dissipating proceeds of asset sales on perquisites, or they may
overpay for acquisitions. However, there is little evidence they systematically mismanage the assets that
they acquire.3
2MP extend Lucas (1978) to multiple industries and study the changes in ￿rm scope and growth in response to demand
and other value shocks the ￿rm receives in each of the industries in which the ￿rm operates.
3Other studies present evidence from the stock market consistent with market value not being destroyed in mergers.
Combined excess returns are slightly positive at announcement of mergers (Andrade, Mitchell and Sta⁄ord (2001)).Graham,
Lemmon and Wolf (2002) show that post-acquisition market value is not dissipated after conglomerate mergers as combined
￿rm market values do not decrease.
3Previous studies of divestitures include Porter (1987), who argues that many mergers are eventually
divested in the long-term. Porter interprets this ￿nding as evidence that mergers are misconceived ventures.
In a careful study, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) refute Porter￿ s view. Kaplan and Weisbach examine
divestitures of targets over relatively long time periods of up to 17 years after a merger. They ￿nd that
44% of their sample of mergers occurring in the years 1971-1982 had been wholly divested by 1989. Using
￿rm write-o⁄ accounting data, up to half of divested mergers were deemed successful. The focus of our
work is rather di⁄erent. We study the restructuring that occurs in a relatively short time period of 3
years after a merger is consummated. Additionally, we are not restricted to examining the timing of
total divestitures because our dataset is at the level of the individual plant. Thus, we are able to track
individually all acquired plants, including plants absorbed by the acquirer￿ s existing divisions, plants sold
between acquisition and ￿nal divestitures of the acquired assets. The disaggregate view of targets at
the level of plants also enables us to test predictions of theories of the ￿rm about both the disposal and
post-acquisition pro￿tability of the acquired plants.
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use Line of Business data to examine the 1975-1977 performance of
segments acquired in 65 tender o⁄ers. Because the Line of Business data is only available in the narrow
1975-1977 time window, they cannot compare the performance of individual business lines of the merged
￿rm with the pre-merger performance of the same units. Thus, Ravenscraft and Scherer are forced to
compare Line of Business data after the merger with the whole target ￿rm pre-merger, which in their
sample may operate several such lines. Furthermore, the tender o⁄ers in their sample occur a median
7 years before the start of the window. As a result, for most o⁄ers they do not observe dispositions in
the years immediately following the tender o⁄er. Finally, their dataset cannot isolate acquired assets as
their data commingles the asset acquired in the tender o⁄ers with the acquirer￿ s own assets. Given these
limitations, they argue that the data ￿compels an agnostic inference that takeovers neither degraded nor
improved the basic operating performance of target ￿rms.(p. 153).￿In a subsequent paper, Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1992) analyze whether sales of ￿rms￿lines of business are higher for post merger divestitures
in the period 1977-81. However, the indicators of merger activity they use do not address post merger
disposition of acquired assets directly. Thus, for example, they examine whether lines of business created
before 1950, but which grow through (some) mergers, have the same total divestiture rates as similar lines
that do not grow through any mergers, or as lines of business created after 1950.
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) study sales of industry segments using COMPUSTAT seg-
ment data. They ￿nd that ￿rms are more likely to sell assets in periods of high industry liquidity. Maksi-
movic and Phillips (2001) and Schoar (2002) look at the changes in plant productivity around acquisitions.
However, none of these papers explores the plant retention/sales/closure decisions, their cross-sectional
determinants, or the asymmetry in the productivity changes depending on whether the plant is retained
or sold o⁄.
In the next section, we present theoretical predictions coming from prior work on mergers and acqui-
4sitions. In Section 3 we describe our sample and the data and variables we use. Sections 4 and 5 estimate
models of the decision to retain, sell, or close plants. Section 6 examines the changes in productive e¢ ciency
after mergers. Section 7 concludes.
2 Hypotheses Tested in Our Study
In our study, we exploit the fact that in mergers the target ￿rm consists of a collection of assets that have
varying degrees of ￿t with the acquirer￿ s core competence. The acquiring ￿rm has to decide how to redraw
its boundaries ￿ which plants to keep and which to sell. By examining how this decision is made we
can test the implications of alternative theories that explain mergers, such as empire building driven by
acquirer taste for ￿rm size or neoclassical theories of ￿rm growth based on comparative advantage.
The hypothesis that ￿rms￿investment and acquisitions are driven by managerial desire to maximize
￿rm size have received a great deal of attention in the ￿nance literature especially since Jensen (1986).4 In
the post-merger context, ine¢ cient investment observationally similar to empire building might also occur
if merger decisions are motivated by hubris, as in Roll (1977), so that the acquirer￿ s managers￿incorrectly
believe that they have the ability to operate the target￿ s assets more productively than they can. If the
￿rm￿ s actions are driven by either a pure taste for large size or hubris, then after a merger we would expect
the following hypotheses to hold:
H1: All or most of the acquired assets are retained after the merger.
H2: The retained assets do not increase in productivity.
An alternative view of mergers and acquisitions is based on a neoclassical theory of the ￿rm, in which
￿rms￿boundaries shift across industries in response to shocks that alter their and their competitors￿com-
parative advantage (Lucas (1978), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)). Under this view, a ￿rm￿ s organization
and talent is likely to be better suited for some industries than for others.5 The payo⁄s from using that
talent depends on the demand level in each industry and the level of competition. Industry shocks change
these payo⁄s. At the margin, the ￿rm deploys its managerial assets in industries where it obtains the
greatest marginal payo⁄. After the purchase, acquirers would sell o⁄ assets that are found not to be a
good match for them.
Firms alter their boundaries in response to new information about their comparative advantage across
industries. Following a merger, the ￿rm retains plants in which it has a comparative advantage and disposes
of plants where it does not. A ￿rm￿ s comparative advantage may vary by industry, and may shift over time
4See also Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Hart and Moore (1992). Early authors in economics that consider empire
building include Baumol (1959) and Meuller (1969).
5Fluck and Lynch (1999) develop a theory related to ￿nancial synergies why ￿rms buy and sell ￿rms across the business
cycle. Under their theory managers make optimal decisions in the face of ￿nancial frictions.
5within an industry as shocks disproportionately advantage highly productive and less productive producers,
leading to plant sales between ￿rms.6 These considerations yield several predictions about the acquirer￿ s
decisions to keep, sell, or close acquired plants which we formalize as the following hypotheses:7
H3: An acquirer is more likely to retain an asset if he can improve or maintain its productivity, and
sell or close an asset if he cannot.
This comparative advantage hypothesis also suggests a relation between the disposal of assets and the
target￿ s internal structure. As shown by MP, the ￿rm is more likely to be an e¢ cient producer in its main
divisions than it its peripheral divisions. Moreover, the acquirer is more likely to do a whole ￿rm takeover
when he wishes to retain the main division rather than a peripheral division. In the latter case, it would
be more e¢ cient for the ￿rm to acquire the peripheral divisions only. Hence,
H4: The assets that are sold are more likely to belong to the target￿ s peripheral divisions rather than
to its main divisions.
We also examine three additional predictions of the MP model for post-merger disposal. First, the
model suggests that the boundary line between assets that are retained and assets that are sold depends
on the opportunity cost of retaining the assets. Thus,
H5: The acquirer is more likely to sell assets that he or she cannot improve when the external market
price of these assets is higher.
Second, the neoclassical model predicts that a ￿rm expands until the marginal value of a plant equals
its opportunity cost under alternative ownership. Thus, a ￿rm whose marginal plants are e¢ cient is less
likely to have grown beyond its optimal size. When such a ￿rm acquires additional assets in a merger, it
is less likely to sell such assets. Speci￿cally,
H6: An acquirer whose marginal plants are e¢ cient is less likely to sell plants acquired in a merger.
Figure 1 illustrates this hypothesis. In order to focus on the essentials, we illustrate the hypothesis
assuming that the acquirer operates in only one industry. Optimum acquirer size is where the productivity
of operating the marginal plant is equal to the opportunity cost that can be realized by selling the plant
to another ￿rm. In Figure 1, the acquirer￿ s marginal plant￿ s productivity exceeds its opportunity cost
and the ￿rm is initially below its optimum size. Following the merger, the acquirer size is greater than
its optimal size and it sells plants until its optimal size is established. Acquirers with highly productive
marginal plants are further away from optimal size and thus keep a larger proportion of acquired plants.
6See Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) for details. Yang (2008) presents a dynamic model of trade in assets as comparative
advantage shifts over time. Matsusaka (2001) develops a neoclassical model of organizational ability with learning in which
acquirers are not certain ex ante if a target is a good match for their capabilities.
7Note that we examine the evolution in the post-merger boundaries of the ￿rm, not the original motivation for the merger.
The broader question of when it is optimal for an acquirer to buy a whole division and when it is optimal to buy a segment
is left for further research.
6Note that Hypothesis 6 pertains to the productivity of the acquirer￿ s marginal plants prior to the
merger. It makes no predictions about the relation between the average productivity of the acquirer￿ s
plants prior to the merger and the probability of a sale. Empirically, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002)
show that the plants in the peripheral divisions of a multi-industry ￿rm are likely to be the ￿rm￿ s marginal
plants. Plants in peripheral divisions have lower productivity and are more likely to be sold than plants
in main industries. With the identi￿cation of e¢ ciency of marginal plants as the e¢ ciency of peripheral
plants, we can test Hypothesis 6. It is possible that the e¢ ciency of peripheral plants may be related to the
overall skill or e¢ ciency of an acquirer. Thus, in the estimations below we also include data on the average
operating margin of acquiring ￿rms as a control in speci￿cations that include acquirer skill in peripheral
plants.
We also examine how e¢ cient and ine¢ cient producers in an industry react di⁄erently to a value
increasing shock that could, for example, be caused by a positive demand shock.8 As a result of a positive
industry shock, acquirers who are less e¢ cient in running marginal plants will ￿nd it costlier to retain
their newly acquired plants because their expertise could be used elsewhere more pro￿tably. The higher
opportunity costs of retaining their newly acquired plants should make acquirers more likely to sell. By
contrast, acquirers who are more e¢ cient at the margin will face a lower incentive to sell.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these e⁄ects. A positive shock to the industry has two e⁄ects. First, it
increases the productivity of each plant, depicted by a vertical movement in the plant productivity curve.
Second, it increases the value of the plant to other producers, depicted as an upward shift of the opportunity
cost of operating a plant. The full e⁄ect depends of the relative magnitudes of the two shifts. Figure 2
shows the case in which the increase in the acquirer￿ s productivity is high relative to the increase in the
opportunity cost of operating plants. In this case, the acquirer retains more plants. Figure 3 shows the
case in which the acquirer￿ s productivity is small in comparison to the increase in the opportunity cost.
In this case, relatively few plants are retained. As argued in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), the relative
e⁄ect of a positive shock on productivity compared to the opportunity cost is higher for more productive
acquirers. We formalize this in the following hypothesis:
H7: Acquirers whose marginal plants are e¢ cient are less likely to sell a plant if the industry in which
the plant operates receives a positive value shock.
While hypotheses (H1)-(H7) are the primary focus of our study, we also provide secondary evidence on
the main hypotheses and conduct other tests to shed light on merger theories. The ￿rst of these additional
tests investigates whether operating gains in mergers are related to operating synergies or other sources of
gains such as reduced corporate overhead. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2006) ￿nd that the greatest stock
market gains in mergers occur when the acquirer and target have similar book equity to market equity
ratios. However, their data does not disentangle the source of the stock market gains, speci￿cally whether
8See MP and the Appendix to Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) for a model demonstrating this e⁄ect, together with an
explicit discussion of assumptions and empirical justi￿cation.
7the pattern re￿ ects greater operational synergies in similar BE/ME ￿rms or whether it re￿ ects other causes
such as reduced administrative overheads. By using plant-level data, and distinguishing between kept and
sold plants, we can test whether synergies arise in the form of productivity gains for kept plants when
acquirer and target book equity to market equity ratios are similar. We therefore test the following:
H8a: E¢ ciency gains of kept plants are higher in acquisitions in which the acquirer and target have
similar book equity to market equity ratios. No such relation exists for sold plants.
The next two hypotheses represent additional cross-sectional tests that further examine agency-related
motives for mergers. One possibility is that only a subset of ￿rms engage in empire building. Firms engaging
in multiple acquisitions may have a particular taste for empire building. To allow for this possibility, in
our empirical speci￿cations we also test agency hypotheses H1 and H2 on the subset of acquisitions made
by ￿rms that engage in multiple acquisitions, namely
H8b: Repeat acquirers keep a greater proportion of the assets that they acquire and operate acquired
assets less e¢ ciently than other ￿rms.
While the above argument focuses on empire building by acquirers, it is also possible that mergers
are a mechanism for resolving empire-building related agency problems in targets. Under this view, some
￿rms build empires and hold a suboptimally large portfolio of assets. They may ￿nd it hard to break up
these assets on their own because managers develop loyalties to employees or certain projects. Mergers
facilitate the break up of such ￿rms and liberate trapped assets (e.g., Jensen (1986); Boot (1992)). Under
this view, the acquirer need not have any comparative advantage in operating the acquired assets, so there
is no particular asymmetry in performance between assets that are kept by acquirers and assets that are
sold o⁄.
H8c: E¢ ciency gains in kept and sold o⁄ plants are equal.
Our last hypothesis examines whether the method of ￿nancing matters. The method of ￿nancing
acquisitions has received a good deal of attention in the mergers literature. Empirically, Andrade, Mitchell
and Sta⁄ord (2001) show that acquirer announcement e⁄ects are lower for stock ￿nanced acquisitions,
perhaps because acquirers might be using overpriced equity (Shleifer and Vishny (2003); Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004)). These ￿rms may be more likely to engage in acquisitions and operate plants in
ways that do not create wealth. In particular, they may not sell newly acquired plants if doing so signals to
the market that they do not have a comparative advantage in operating such plants. Alternatively, Eckbo,
Giammarino and Heinkel (1988) argue that cash transactions could signal superior bidder quality, in which
case bidders may be less likely to dispose of plants. This discussion suggests the following hypothesis:
H8d: Disposal of assets di⁄ers in stock and cash transactions.
It should be noted that while our data allow us to test whether the aquirers￿disposition of the targets
assets is consistent with their comparative advantage, we cannot rule out all forms of agency problems.
8Our tests of e¢ cient post-merger restructuring do not rule out every form of agency and do not imply that
acquirers have no unresolved agency problems. For instance, asset outcomes could be e¢ cient but there
could still be redistributive e⁄ects from acquirer to target shareholders because acquirers overpay for their
acquisitions, as suggested by Roll (1986), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Moeller, Schlingemann
and Stulz (2005). Alternatively, acquirers managers may divest e¢ ciently, but divert a portion of the
proceeds for their own bene￿t as higher overhead at the ￿rm level.
3 Data
3.1 Sample
Our initial sample comes from the Securities Data Company (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database,
where we identify all mergers announced between 1981 and 2000, involved U.S. targets, had a completion
code equal to 1, and as in Schwert (1996), were completed within 180 days of announcement. To be a
potential candidate for our ￿nal sample, we require that at least one of the target￿ s 4-digit SIC codes as
reported in SDC be in the manufacturing sector, i.e., have 4-digit SIC codes between 2000 and 3999. We
match the resulting sample with the Longitudinal Research database (LRD) maintained at the Census
Bureau. The LRD tracks approximately 50,000 manufacturing plants every year in the Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM). The ASM contains plant level information on output, employment, and expenditures
of all manufacturing plants that have at least 250 employees. All smaller plants are surveyed every ￿fth
year. In addition, a random sample of smaller plants is selected every ￿fth year to participate in a rotating
￿ve-year panel. Once selected, plants are required by federal law to answer the survey questions. Many
data items used also represent items that are also reported to the IRS (e.g., the number of employees,
employee compensation, total value of shipments).
To track the acquired plants in the LRD, we require that the selected M&A deals have a match with
the LRD. The sample period we study is based on data availability in the Census Bureau and SDC. The
start date is based on availability of reliable data on M&A transactions in the SDC database. The end
date of 2000 is dictated by the fact that we need three years after the completion date to track ownership
changes. When we conducted the analysis, the Census Bureau data were available only until 2004.
For every target that is matched to the LRD database, we record the owner of the plant in the reporting
year prior to the acquisition completion date. We track the plant ownership forward three years after the
acquisition completion year. For ownership change we rely on this identi￿cation which was available for
all years. If the plant is shut down within the three year period, we record the year in which it was shut.
If the plant remains open, we trace its ownership. In some cases, we cannot track the plant disposition
decision reliably, because the output or the number of employees is below the Census reporting cuto⁄in the
next ￿ve year sample. We discard these cases. They account for about 5% of the total plants transferred
9in our sample. Given we calculate productivity and cash ￿ ow changes as well as use lagged year data, we
also lose the initial year a ￿rm or ￿rm segment enters the database. We also lose observations that are
non-contiguous. Finally, we only include ￿rms if their plants in an industry (at the three-digit SIC code)
have a total shipments value of at least $1 million in real 1982 dollars.
Table 1 shows the composition of our sample over time and how many of potential mergers we matched
to the LRD manufacturing database. In our ￿nal sample of 2,030 acquisitions, the target has at least
one reported SIC code between 2000 and 3999 according to the SDC database or the COMPUSTAT
database and had matching target data in COMPUSTAT (both the SDC and COMPUSTAT database
report multiple SIC codes, with the COMPUSTAT database reporting segment SIC codes beginning in
1984). We then match these deals to the Department of Commerce LRD database. Of these 2,030
transactions, we matched 1,303 transactions to the LRD database. By examining deals classi￿ed as
outside manufacturing by SDC and COMPUSTAT, we also match an additional 180 transactions giving
us a total match of 1,483 deals. The 1,483 M&A deals constitute our primary sample. Failures to match
Compustat to Department of Commerce data occur for several potential reasons. First, ￿rms with smaller
plants will not match up to the database as plants of ￿rms are only covered if the plants have more than
200 employees. Second, we are using Compustat data that was matched by Department of Commerce sta⁄
by name and address. In many cases, names in the Commerce Department data represent divisions and
not ultimate parents and thus the ￿rm may not be matched. Comparing the Compustat data median and
mean sales data for matched and unmatched ￿rms, we ￿nd that the matched ￿rms are three to four times
larger than unmatched ￿rms, supporting the ￿rst explanation. Matched ￿rms have median (mean) sales
of 187.166 (980.551) million dollars, while unmatched ￿rms have median (mean) sales of 43.988 (342.813)
million dollars.
Insert Table 1 here
The time period from 1981 to 2000 covers two cycles in M&A transactions. The number of transactions
in our sample increase in the 1980s, peak in the late 1980s, then decline in the early 1990s, before picking
up again towards the end of our sample period. The dates of the peaks in M&A activity are related to the
NBER business cycle dates. They are also consistent with the literature on merger waves (Andrade and
Sta⁄ord (2001), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Harford (2005)).
3.2 Characteristics of Acquirers and Targets
Table 2 describes the cross-sectional characteristics of the ￿rms involved in the transaction. In columns 2
and 3, we report the mean and median market value and book-to-market decile of targets for each sample
year. The book to market ratio is computed from COMPUSTAT data following the algorithm of Fama and
French. We obtain the cuto⁄s for the deciles of the distribution of BE/ME from Ken French￿ s website for
10the relevant year. The market value of each ￿rm is also obtained as the market value in the December of
the year prior to the transaction and is assigned deciles based on Ken French￿ s website. Target ￿rms tend
to have below median market capitalization. The median target￿ s market capitalization decile is under
3 in every year except 1982. In each year the target ￿rms￿book-to-market deciles are higher than their
corresponding market value deciles. However, the median target￿ s book-to-market decile is consistently
below the market￿ s median book-to-market decile. The target￿ s mean book-to-market decile is close to 5,
and reaches a maximum of 5.84 in 1991.
Insert Table 2 here
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 report the industry-adjusted margins of plants owned by acquirers and
targets in the year prior to the acquisition. We ￿nd that both acquirers and targets operate pro￿table
plants that tend to earn above-industry margins. For 16 out of 18 years covered by our sample, the median
industry-adjusted margins of acquirer-owned plants are positive. Target owned plants display a similar
pattern. In 15 out of 18 years, industry-adjusted margins of acquirers exceed those of targets, suggesting
that acquirers are more productive than targets.
The last two columns of Table 2 report data on the de￿ ated shipments of acquirers and targets. The
median de￿ ated shipments of acquirer plants are between 1.5 and 7.7 times the median shipments of target
plants. Thus, manufacturing plants of acquirers tend to be larger than plants operated by targets. The
ratio of plant sizes is somewhat lower than the (unreported) ratio of market values of acquirers to targets,
re￿ ecting the fact that in our sample, acquirers not only own larger plants than targets but also operate
more plants than targets.
We also investigated the cross-sectional characteristics of the subset of mergers for which both acquirer
and target characteristics are available on COMPUSTAT and LRD. Except for 1983, the median and
mean BE/ME deciles for acquirers are below 5. The median and mean BE/ME deciles for acquirers are
signi￿cantly lower in the 1990s, when they are close to 2, suggesting that acquirers are more likely to be
glamour ￿rms in the 1990s. Interestingly, targets also tend to have median and mean BE/ME below 5, as
in the larger sample in Table 2. Thus, both the acquirers and the targets tend to be growth ￿rms rather
than distressed or value ￿rms. The low BE/ME deciles and the higher BE/ME for acquirers relative to
targets mirrors similar evidence on the high margins and productivity in Table 2. One interpretation of
this pattern is that the opportunity cost of suboptimally used capacity is high when there are more growth
opportunities, so mergers tend to concentrate in ￿rms and time periods in which there are more growth
opportunities. Alternatively, it is also possible that mergers tend to occur when market valuations are
relatively high, perhaps because ￿rms can use their stock as currency for acquiring other companies, as in
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004).
For this subsample, we also examined the size of acquirers as re￿ ected in the Fama-French market
capitalization deciles. Except for 1981, the median and mean market capitalization decile for acquirers
11exceed 5, while median and mean target market value deciles are consistently below 4. In terms of actual
market capitalization, the median acquirer size by year ranges from $381mm to $1.9 billion, about ten
times the median size of targets. Acquirers in the late 1990s tend to have especially high market values
relative to the target size.
3.3 Variable Construction
i. Organizational Form and Relatedness
To obtain a measure of organizational structure, we aggregate each ￿rm￿ s plants that operate in each
industry into portfolios at the three-digit SIC code level. We call these ￿rm-level industry portfolios
of plants ￿segments.￿ Segments, de￿ned this way, capture all the plant-level operations of a ￿rm in an
industry.9 We classify ￿rms as single segment or multiple segment, based on the three-digit SIC code.
We classify a ￿rm as a multi-segment ￿rm if it produces more than 10 percent of its sales in a second
SIC code outside its principal three-digit SIC code. Using the 10 percent cut-o⁄ facilitates comparison
with previous studies as 10 percent is the cut-o⁄ that public ￿rms report. For multiple-segment ￿rms, we
also classify each segment as either a main segment or a peripheral segment. Main segments are segments
whose value of shipments is at least 25% of the ￿rm￿ s total shipments. We classify a target ￿rm￿ s plants
as being related to the acquiring ￿rm if it has the same 3-digit SIC code as a main division of the acquirer.
Thus, within acquisitions some plants can be classi￿ed as related and others as unrelated.
ii. Plant-level Measures of Productive E¢ ciency
We use two measures of productive e¢ ciency: operating margin and total factor productivity. We
calculate operating margins for each plant. The numerator of this margin is the value of shipments less
the value of labor costs and all input costs, such as materials and energy. We divide this numerator by
the value of shipments made by the plant. We industry adjust a plant￿ s operating margin in each year by
subtracting out the industry median operating margin. All dollar values for this calculation are de￿ ated
to 1982 dollars using three-digit price with separate de￿ ators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for
shipments, wage costs, materials, and energy. This operating margin di⁄ers from a typical cash ￿ ow
number because our plant-level data does not measure indirect segmental level costs, such as advertising
and research and development. Our measures focus on the operating or productive e¢ ciency of plants.
A related measure of productive e¢ ciency is the total factor productivity (TFP) of a plant. We compute
TFP to capture acquirer skill and also to examine post-merger performance. We use as our measure of
acquirer skill, the average TFP of a plants ￿rm￿ s peripheral divisions (divisions with less than 10% of ￿rm
9The segments we construct do not correspond to those reported by COMPUSTAT. Segment data reported by COMPU-
STAT are subject to reporting biases. Firms have considerable ￿ exibility in how they report segments as shown by Pacter
(1993). Firms may also have strategic reasons for the speci￿c segments they choose or choose not to report, as Hayes and
Lundholm (1996) shows. Hyland (1999) ￿nds that only 72 percent of ￿rms that report under the FASB standards that they
go from one segment to more than one segment actually increase their number of segments. See also Vilalonga (2004).
12output). TFP takes the actual amount of output a plant produces with a given amount of inputs and
compares it to a predicted amount of output. ￿Predicted output￿is what the plant is expected to have
produced, given the amount of inputs it used. A plant that produces more than the predicted amount of
output has a greater-than-average productivity. This measure does not impose the restrictions of constant
returns to scale and constant elasticity of scale that a ￿dollar in, dollar out￿ cash ￿ ow measure would
require.
To calculate a plant￿ s TFP and predicted output, we assume that the plants in each industry have
a translog production function. This functional form is a second-degree approximation to any arbitrary
production function, and therefore takes into account interactions between inputs. In estimating the
production function we use the last ￿ve years of data for each plant - thus the ￿rst year of our data for
which we have calculated productivity is 1979. For each industry we estimate this production function
using an unbalanced panel with plant-level ￿xed e⁄ects. To estimate productivity, we take the translog
production function and run a regression of log of the total value of shipments on the log of inputs, including
cross-product and squared terms:








cjk lnLjit lnLkit; (1)
where Qit represents output of plant i in year t; and Ljit is the quantity of input j used in production for
plant i for time period t. A is a technology shift parameter, assumed to be constant by industry, fi is a
plant-￿rm speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect (if a plant changes owners a new ￿xed e⁄ect is estimated. We leave o⁄ the
￿rm subscript for tractability), and cj =
PN
i=1 cji indexes returns-to-scale. We de￿ ate for industry price
at the four digit level.
We obtain our measure of plant-level TFP from equation (1). This measure has two components that
we add together to get a measure of productivity. First we have a plant-￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect, fi;. The ￿xed
e⁄ect captures persistent productivity e⁄ects, such as those arising from managerial quality (Griliches
(1957) and Mundlak (1961, 1978)). It also captures a segment￿ s ability to price higher than the industry
average. Second, we obtain a plant residual in each year. In each case we standardize plant-level TFP
by subtracting out industry average TFP in each year and dividing by the standard deviation of TFP for
each industry. We standardize to control for di⁄erences in precision with which productivity is estimated
within industries. This correction is analogous to a simple measurement error correction and is similar to
the procedure used to produce standardized cumulative excess returns in event studies.10
We examine the change in industry-adjusted operating margins and TFP after mergers. In analyzing
the changes over time, we control for predictable time series variation in margins and TFP by subtracting
the typical change that occurs for plants. For instance, we estimate the typical change in TFP by regressing
10This standardization does not a⁄ect the results we report. The results have similar levels of signi￿cance when we do not
standardize productivity in this manner.
13future changes in TFP (and operating margins) on initial TFP (operating margins) levels for all plants.
Analogous to obtaining a coe¢ cient of mean reversion, we obtain a coe¢ cient for predicting the change in
performance based on the initial level of productivity or operating margin for each year. We apply this
coe¢ cient to the initial levels of TFP (operating margins) for the plants of merging ￿rms in our sample and
compare actual performance to predicted performance. We also examine the mean and median changes
in industry-adjusted performance without conditioning on the level of performance.
In estimating the operating margins and TFPs in our sample, we use data for over one million plant
years, and for approximately 50,000 plants each year. In the productivity regression for each industry, we
include three di⁄erent types of inputs, capital, labor, and materials, as explanatory variables. All these
data exist at the plant level. Our productivity calculations do not capture any headquarters or divisional
level costs that are not reported at the plant-level (i.e. overhead, research and development). The ASM
also does not state the actual quantity shipped by each plant, but shows only the value of shipments. We
thus de￿ ate the value of shipments by 1982 price de￿ ators to get a real value of shipments. For all inputs
and outputs measured in dollars, we adjust for in￿ ation by using four-digit SIC de￿ ator data from the
Bartelsman and Gray (1994) database. Each input has to have a non-zero reported value. Kovenock
and Phillips (1997) describe these inputs and the method for accounting for in￿ ation and depreciation of
capital stock in more detail.
iii. Other Firm and Industry Control Variables
We also include other ￿rm and industry variables in our regressions. We include the log of ￿rm size
and the number of plants operated by the ￿rm at the beginning of the year. We also include the log of
target size divided by acquirer size as a measure of relative size for the target to the acquirer. We de￿ne
￿rm size as the total de￿ ated value (using industry price de￿ ators) of shipments in 1982 dollars. We also
include four industry-level variables: INDRET - the two-year buy and hold return for the Fama-French 48-
industry group to which a target plant belongs, industry R&D ratio, INDMARG - the industry operating
margin, and the standard deviation of the industry operating margin (SD - INDMARG). Industry R&D
(IND R&D) is calculated as the sum of ￿rm-level R&D from Compustat at the three-digit SIC code level,
divided by the sum of ￿rm-level sales in each year. INDMARG is the sum of ￿rm-level operating income
before depreciation from Compustat at the three-digit SIC code level, divided by the sum of ￿rm-level
sales in each year. SD(INDMARG) is the standard deviation of the industry operating margin using the
last ten years of data.
We include the target￿ s book-to-market value of equity ratio in all regressions. This variable is con-
structed using the book value of equity from Compustat divided by the market value of equity in each year.
An analogous variable is calculated for the acquiring ￿rm. We also calculate a measure of related using
market value measures. We construct a variable called ￿diagonal.￿ We ￿rst compute the decile of a ￿rm￿ s
book-to-market ratio using breakpoints obtained from Ken French￿ s website. We then de￿ne diagonal to
14be equal to one if the target and acquirer book-to-market deciles are the same or have deciles within one
of each other, and zero otherwise.
4 The Decision to Sell, Keep, or Close Target Plants
4.1 Overall Disposition Rates
Table 3 describes the status of target-owned plants acquired in a merger at the end of three years after the
merger. We benchmark the sello⁄and closure rates against industry rates for ￿rms not involved in mergers.
These asset sales and closure rates are based on ￿rms not involved in mergers that are in industries that
experience a merger transaction in the same 3 digit SIC code and year. Even in the relatively narrow
window of three years, there is a surprising degree of turnover of just-acquired plants in our sample. In
the aggregate sample, 12,893 plants change hands in acquisitions. Of these, only 54.4% continue to be
operated by the acquirer 3 years after the acquisition is completed. Of the remaining, 18.6% are closed,
while 27.0% of the plants are sold o⁄. We discuss basic patterns in these sello⁄ rates and then turn to
the cross-sectional tests. These tests examine whether the plant retention decision is in accordance with
neoclassical theories of comparative advantage.
Insert Table 3 here
4.2 Disposition by number of plants acquired
We also classify targets based on the number of target plants transferred in the M&A transaction. We sort
the sample into ￿ve bins: 1-5 plants acquired, 6-10 plants acquired, 11-25 plants acquired, 26-50 plants
acquired, and more than 51 plants acquired. We examine whether the tendency to dispose of acquired
plants is more pronounced when a large number of target plants are acquired. This outcome is likely, for
instance, if the acquirer has a comparative advantage in operating only some of a multi-division targets
lines of business or if it buys multi-plant targets with a view to the view of creating value by breaking up
the plants, as in the bustup mergers analyzed by Berger and Ofek (1996).
Table 3 suggests that the tendency to dispose of acquired plants is not necessarily concentrated in
multi-plant target acquisitions. To the ￿rst order, the fraction of the target plants kept at the end of year
3 by the acquirer remains ￿ at at about 55% when up to 50 plants are transferred in acquisitions. The
kept proportion declines to about 52% when more than 50 plants are acquired. About one quarter of all
plants acquired are sold o⁄ by year 3 and this proportion does not vary much with the number of plants
transferred in the acquisition.
The industry-size-year benchmarks for ￿rms not involved in mergers are much lower than the rates
shown for ￿rms involved in mergers. The benchmark probability of plant sale is 7.2% if the ￿rm has
151-5 plants, rising to 14% if ￿rms have 26-50 plants, with an overall sale rate of 8.98%. These rates are
only about one-third of the proportion sold o⁄ for target ￿rms involved in acquisitions. The probability
of plant closure after mergers is 16% if only 1-5 plants are transferred in the acquisition and is relatively
￿ at at about 20% when at least ￿ve plants are transferred in the merger transaction. The closure rates
for industry-size-year benchmarks for ￿rms not involved in mergers are much lower than the rates shown
for ￿rms involved in mergers. The probability of plant closure is 2.4% for matched industry ￿rms with
1-5 plants and is relatively ￿ at at about 5% for matched ￿rms with more than ￿ve plants. The last two
columns of Table 3 report sello⁄ and closure rates for plants owned by the acquirer prior to merger. These
rates tend to be higher than benchmarks but lower than target plant disposal rates. As we discuss below,
this di⁄erence is due to observable di⁄erences in plant characteristics rather than di⁄erent propensities
based on whether the plant was owned by the acquirer or it belonged to the target.
Overall, the summary statistics suggest that there is signi￿cant post-merger restructuring of plants in a
short period of three years after merger completion. Acquirers do not passively absorb the newly acquired
plants. This ￿nding provides little a priori support for the predictions of Hypothesis 1, or a pure empire
building motivation for acquisitions that would predict that acquirers retain the bulk of assets acquired
through a merger.
4.3 Disposition in the 1980s versus 1990s
The merger wave in the 1980s is often characterized as the unwinding of the conglomerate expansion wave of
the 1960s and 1970s. If so, the probability either retaining a plant should be higher in the 1990s compared
to the 1980s. Table 4 shows that the overall percentage of kept plants is higher at 59% in the 1990s deals
compared to 50% in the 1980s. Also, the total number of plants in large acquisitions involving at least 51
plants, in which the undoing of ine¢ ciently large conglomerates is more likely to be a prime objective, is
2,497 plants in the 1980s, almost 55% more than the 1,596 plants transferred in large acquisitions in the
1990s.
4.4 Relatedness
We next classify the post-merger disposition decision by the type of acquisition. If expansion of managerial
scope motivates related acquisitions, as in MP, related acquisitions should result in greater retention of
target plants. On the other hand, if acquisitions are carried out with the view of shutting down extra
capacity, perhaps for reasons of maximizing pro￿ts in an oligopolistic setting, there could be more closures
in related acquisition. Anti-trust concerns would also predict lower likelihood of retention in acquisitions
that are related, since anti-trust concerns would require less retention in cases where there are related
acquisitions.
We measure relatedness on the plant level, based on whether target plants have the same 3-digit SIC
16code as an acquirer￿ s main division, as described earlier in the variable section above. In our sample,
4,080 related plants are acquired while 8,813 plants are not related. We ￿nd that 55% of related plants are
kept while 51% of unrelated plants are kept. There are similar di⁄erences in the sello⁄ decision. 22.5% of
related plants are sold o⁄ while 27.5% of unrelated plants are sold o⁄.
5 Disposal of Plants: Multinomial Logit
The high proportion of target plants that are sold suggests that unconditional empire building is not the
sole driver of acquisitions. In this section, we analyze the cross-sectional variation in disposition decisions
of acquirers to test neoclassical theories of ￿rm scope. To test these hypotheses, we examine how the
proportion of plants acquired depends on the marginal skill of the acquirer and the opportunity cost of
retaining the acquired plants. We also include other control variables, including the size of the acquisition,
acquirer characteristics, industry conditions, the characteristics of the acquired plants and their position
in the organizational structure of the target.
We model the decision to keep, sell, or close a target plant acquired after a merger using a multinomial
logit model. The dependent variable in this model is 0, 1, or 2 depending on whether the plant is sold,
kept, or closed, respectively. Thus, the baseline decision is to keep a plant, and Table 4 reports estimates
for the decision to sell o⁄ an acquired target plant (upper Panel) or the decision to close the plant (lower
Panel) relative to the baseline decision to keep. The results in Table 4 focus on statistical signi￿cance. To
assess the economic impact of the explanatory variables in the logit speci￿cation .we report estimates of
the marginal e⁄ects in Table 5.
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here
Panels A and B of Table 4 show the estimated coe¢ cients in the decision to sell or close an acquired
plant, respectively. We report estimates of ￿ve speci￿cations that vary according to the explanatory
variables included in the model. We divide the explanatory variables into several groups. One group
includes characteristics of the transacting ￿rms and the plants￿position in their organizational structure.
The second group pertains to the target plants￿industry. The ￿nal group of explanatory variables includes
additional acquirer characteristics and interactions with industry variables, which allow us to further
test predictions about e¢ cient disposal decisions. Speci￿cation (1) reports the e⁄ect of the target plant
characteristics to test hypotheses H1 and H2. Acquirer characteristics are added in speci￿cation (2). Here,
we also introduce a dummy variable for the 1980s time period to control for the potential changes in the
disposal decision between the 1980s and the 1990s. Speci￿cation 3 includes the key acquirer operating
margins and skill variables are added in speci￿cation (3) to test H5 and H6 and the key prediction of
the comparative advantage theory. Finally, speci￿cations (4)-(5) show the e⁄ects of several industry-level
variables on the plant disposal decision to test hypotheses H3, H4, and H5 - including the key industry
17return variable to capture the opportunity cost facing the acquiring ￿rm. As in Table 4, Panels A and B
of Table 6 focus on the marginal e⁄ects related to the sell and close decisions, respectively, while Panel C
reports the marginal e⁄ects for the keep decision.
5.1 Target Characteristics
Panels A and B of Tables 4 and 5 show that plants that are related (RELATED) (a plant that produces in
a similar 3-digit SIC code) to the acquirer￿ s existing divisions and the centrality (TMAIN) of the plant in
the target￿ s organization are less likely to be sold than a similar plant belonging to the target￿ s peripheral
divisions. Both variables are statistically signi￿cant and economically material and their e⁄ects persist
across all the speci￿cations in the tables which include industry and acquirer￿ s characteristics. At the
median of the sample data, the marginal e⁄ects of belong to the target￿ s main division and being in an
industry related to the acquirer are of similar magnitude and each reduce the probability of the plant being
sold by approximately 13% in most speci￿cations.
The signi￿cance of the RELATED variable is consistent with the acquirer exploiting its core ability
and expanding in divisions that are more productive. Its sign is not consistent with anti-trust motivations
for divestment, since anti-trust concerns would predict less retention of related assets while we ￿nd greater
retention of assets that are related.11 Other evidence we do not report shows that related divisions are
more productive. The signi￿cance of TMAIN, and more broadly the fact that acquirers tend to keep only
some parts of the target suggests that acquirers buy whole ￿rms when they are only interested in some
parts of the target ￿rm.
A question that naturally arises is whether acquirers should buy the parts of the target they are
interested in or acquire the whole ￿rm and divest its unwanted parts. We leave this interesting theoretical
and empirical issue for future work. From conversations with investment bankers, it appears that taxes
are partially responsible for this choice. Asset purchases above their book values from C corporations
would result in taxes paid by the selling ￿rm and also additional taxes when proceeds are distributed to
shareholders. Full ￿rm purchases structured as stock purchases, followed by sale of unwanted peripheral
divisions, can reduce taxes paid at the time of transaction.
The next variable in the logit model is the industry-adjusted pro￿tability of a target plant, TMARG.
We expect that pro￿table plants are a priori less likely to be closed, but it is not clear what relation plant
pro￿tability should have to the decision to sell a plant. Weaker plants may have the greater potential for
improvement, suggesting a positive relation between sello⁄ and plant pro￿tability. On the other hand,
acquirer plants tend to be more pro￿table (Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Schoar (2002)). If more
productive target assets tend to be more complementary, the weaker assets acquired should be more likely
11We also discuss later how including industry concentration measures from the Census Department do not change these
results.
18to be sold o⁄. We ￿nd evidence for this view. The TMARG pro￿tability variable is a statistically signi￿cant
predictor of the decision to sell and it has a negative coe¢ cient. The marginal e⁄ect of a target plant￿ s
operating margin lowers the odds of a sello⁄ between 8 and 9 percent. Target plant pro￿tability matters
even after including other controls for the decision to sell. On the retention decision,the marginal e⁄ect
of a plant￿ s operating margin is associated with a 18-19% increase in probability that the plant will be
retained. Pro￿tability is also signi￿cant in explaining the closure decision, as expected by a signi￿cant 9
percent.
The variable TMARG controls for pro￿tability at the plant level. We supplement this with the target
book-to-market ratio as a potential predictor of the disposition decision. The associated variable, TBEME,
which is the BE/ME decile to which a target belongs. TBEME should capture the future pro￿tability or
the growth prospects of targets, at the level of the enterprise being acquired. The target ￿rm￿ s book-to-
market ratio is positively related to the probability of sale at signi￿cance levels of between 1% and 10%
depending on speci￿cation.12 An alternative interpretation is that high TBEME indicates targets with low
valuations. Thus, a positive coe¢ cient for TBEME indicates that low valued targets are more likely to
result in a post-merger asset sale, perhaps because the target￿ s portfolio of assets was suboptimal. Table 5
indicates that the marginal e⁄ect of book-to-market is more modest than that of TMARG, ranging from
1% to 3% in the sello⁄ decision at signi￿cance levels ranging from 1% to 10%. TBEME has relatively little
e⁄ect on the closure decision, where it tends to be economically and statistically insigni￿cant.
5.2 Acquirer Characteristics
Speci￿cation (2) of Table 4 introduces controls for acquirer size. Following Healy, Palepu, and Ruback
(1991), we include the size of the acquirer relative to target size (TRELSIZE). In addition, we include the
logarithm of the de￿ ated output and following Table 3, the number of plants transferred in the acquisition
as additional controls. The coe¢ cient for the aggregate acquirer output is positive, suggesting that large
acquirers are more likely to divest target plants. The marginal e⁄ect of this variable is only about 1%.
Neither the relative size of the target nor the number of plants transferred is signi￿cant.
Speci￿cation (3) of Table 4 introduces other acquirer characteristics. The overall acquirer margin,
AMARG, is insigni￿cant. Thus, the probability that a plant is sold does not depend on the acquirer￿ s
overall operating margin, so more pro￿table acquirers do not sell plants with a higher probability than less
pro￿table acquirers. On the other hand, the acquirer￿ s productivity in its marginal businesses matters.
Consistent with neoclassical models of ￿rm scope, we ￿nd that in speci￿cations (3) and (4) that as predicted,
the pro￿tability of acquirer￿ s peripheral plants (ASKILL) reduces the probability that the acquirer will
sell an acquired plant. Thus, a ￿rm whose marginal divisions have low pro￿tability is less likely to retain
12Note that high values of book-to-market are associated with higher target plant sales even after controlling for industry
margins, stock price run-ups and R&D levels in speci￿cations (4) and (5).
19a newly acquired plant. From Table 6, the marginal e⁄ect is economically signi￿cant. A one standard
deviation in the e¢ ciency of peripheral divisions, holding all other factors including ￿rm wide operating
margins constant, is associated with a 17% increase in the probability of the plant being retained.
The signi￿cance of ASKILL is consistent with the prediction that as a ￿rm￿ s scope increases, its ability to
operate plants e¢ ciently at the margin decreases. A ￿rm whose marginal divisions are relatively ine¢ cient
is less likely to increase its size by retaining plants acquired in a merger, holding all other things equal. The
signi￿cance of ASKILL is particularly striking in light of the insigni￿cance of the overall acquirer margin,
AMARG. In other words, the acquirer￿ s average industry-adjusted operating margin does not a⁄ect the
disposition decision signi￿cantly. The decision to retain a plant is function of the acquirer￿ s ability at the
margin rather than its average ability, precisely as predicted by neoclassical theories in which mergers are
driven by changes in optimal ￿rm scope.
5.3 Industry Characteristics
Speci￿cations (4) and (5) in Table 4 introduce several industry variables. These variables capture the
industry conditions because the decision to retain or sell a plant is likely to depend on the value of assets
to other industry participants and based on industry shocks as studies by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996).
We capture the opportunity cost and the value in the industry after industry shocks using the industry
return in the two years subsequent. Furthermore, the changing opportunities within an industry, which is
captured by industry variability, could also a⁄ect the decision to sell a plant.
Speci￿cation (4) shows that plants in industries that experience a large run up in market valuation
have a signi￿cantly higher probability of being sold, as shown by the signi￿cant coe¢ cient of INDRET.
Table 5 shows that a one standard deviation in INDRET increases the probability of an asset sale by 3%.
Following Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), the opportunity cost of retaining a plant following a positive
shock in the industry is likely to be higher when the plant owner is less e¢ cient. Such producers are better
o⁄selling their capacity after a positive industry shock because the capacity they own is more productively
used outside the ￿rm. We test for this explanation in speci￿cation (6) by interacting the industry return
runup (INDRET) with the e¢ ciency of the acquirer￿ s peripheral divisions (ASKILL). Consistent with
this opportunity cost prediction, while newly acquired plants are more likely to be sold following positive
industry returns, these sales are less likely to occur when the acquirer is not e¢ cient in running in running
peripheral divisions. E¢ cient acquirers are signi￿cantly less to sell plants following a positive shock their
industry than at other times. Table 5 shows that the estimated marginal e⁄ects are signi￿cant. A one
standard deviation increase in the interacted variable results in a 55% reduction in the probability of a
plant sale.
Table 4 also reports coe¢ cients for other variables. Plant sales following mergers are more likely in high
R&D industries. Greater variability in industry margins is not related to the probability of sale. However,
20the level of industry margin matters. Sales are more likely when industries have high operating margins. A
one standard deviation in operating margin increases the probability of sales by an economically signi￿cant
12%. We also ￿nd evidence that the time period matters. The 1980s dummy variable has a positive and
signi￿cant e⁄ect. The rate of plant sales is approximately 4% higher in the 1980s.
The estimates for the probability of plant closure are presented in Panel B of Table 4, with the marginal
e⁄ects presented in Panel B of Table 5. Acquired plants in the target￿ s main division, plants with high
operating margins and plants in industries related to the acquirer are less likely to be closed. Plants in
mergers where the target is large relative to the acquirer, and where the acquirer itself is large are also likely
to be closed. We also ￿nd other signi￿cant industry e⁄ects. The probability of a closure of an acquired
plant is higher in high R&D industries, industries with high operating margins and industries in which the
dispersion of plant productivities is high. Closures were signi￿cantly higher in the 1980￿ s, running at an
about 7-9% higher rate as shown in Panel B of Table 5. The lower probability of plant retention in the
1980s transactions supports a widely held view that the 1980s mergers reversed the conglomerate wave of
the 1960s and 1970s.
In contrast to the sales decision, we do not ￿nd that the decision to close a plant is related to the
productivity of the acquirer￿ s peripheral divisions, the run-up is stock prices, or the interaction of the
two. Thus, closure does not depend on changes in the opportunity cost of operating the plant by the
acquirer or another producer. Similarly, the acquirer￿ s operating margin does not predict plant closures.
The requirement that the NPV be non-negative for the plant to remain open is less likely to be sensitive
to the marginal changes in the comparative advantage of the owner, especially since the opportunity cost
of closing the plant is selling it to the highest bidder, whose bid may change in di⁄erent ways from that
of the owner in response to an industry shock. This contrasts with the sale decision, which is sensitive
to shifts in the relative opportunity costs of ownership, which themselves changes as the e¢ ciencies of
di⁄erent producers in the industry shift in response to industry shocks.
Taken together the ￿ndings in Tables 4 and 5 provide strong evidence that acquiring ￿rms on average
make economically rational asset disposal decisions. Assets in the target￿ s main divisions and assets that
are in industries related to acquirer are more likely to be retained (Hypothesis 4). Assets whose opportunity
costs have increased are more likely to be sold (Hypothesis 5). Acquirers who are e¢ cient in operating
marginal plants are more likely to retain purchased plants (Hypothesis 6). In particular, acquirers who
are e¢ cient at operating marginal plants are more likely to retain them following positive shocks to the
industry (Hypothesis 7). There are the states in which the neoclassical model predicts that the acquirer
has a higher comparative advantage in retaining the plant. Importantly, the decision to dispose or retain
the asset depends on the e¢ ciency of the acquirer￿ s marginal plants (Hypothesis 6).
215.4 Other Unreported Results
5.4.1 Method of Payment
Hypothesis 8d suggests that acquirers may treat assets acquired in stock transactions di⁄erently than
assets acquired in cash transactions. Ex-ante, one might expect that sello⁄s and closures are more likely
in acquisitions that are cash ￿nanced. To test this we included (but do not report) the method of payment
as an explanatory variable. Speci￿cally, we included in the multinomial logit model a binary variable that
equals 1 if an acquisition is ￿nanced with at least 51% cash and is zero otherwise. We ￿nd that the method
of ￿nancing an acquisition is not signi￿cant in explaining the disposition decisions, both statistically and
economically.
We also consider an instrumental variables speci￿cation to further explore whether predicted stock
explained the disposition decision. Accordingly, we reestimate the logit equation in Table 5 with instru-
ments for the stock variable. Our instruments include the acquirer￿ s industry average R&D expenditure to
sales, the industry level market-to-book ratio, the industry-adjusted pro￿tability, the standard deviation
of the industry-adjusted pro￿tability, and whether an acquirer is a conglomerate. The predicted stock
variable is insigni￿cant. These results suggest that, contrary to Hypothesis 8d, the method of payment
does not matter in determining post-merger restructuring decisions, which are instead dominated by asset
side considerations about what type of assets ￿t best in the merged entity.
5.4.2 Industry Concentration and Industry Fixed E⁄ects
We reestimate Tables 4 and 5 after replacing all the industry variables by 3-digit industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
With one exception, the coe¢ cient estimates for acquirer and target variables were within 5% of values
reported here, and at the same level of signi￿cance. The exception is the coe¢ cient of ASKILL, which
increased from a 5% to a 1% level of signi￿cance with the 3-digit industry dummies.
We also examine if industry concentration ratios impact our results. Antitrust o¢ cials may require
acquiring ￿rms to sell o⁄ target plants in highly concentrated industries. Industry concentration is not
signi￿cant in explaining post-merger restructuring decisions. In fact, the coe¢ cient for concentration is
opposite to the antitrust explanation. As industry concentration increases, acquiring ￿rms are less likely
to sell o⁄plants and more likely to close plants. The sign of industry concentration is more consistent with
the conjecture that acquirers in concentrated industries are eliminating productive capacity belonging to
rivals. The coe¢ cients are never signi￿cant, as the p-value for the coe¢ cient on the concentration ratio in
the sell o⁄ speci￿cation is 0.133 and for the closure speci￿cation is 0.142.
226 Post-Merger Performance
Plants obtained in an acquisition can be kept, sold, or closed o⁄ after the acquisition. In this section, we
analyze the changes in performance of the kept and sold plants still in operation at the end of year 3 after
the acquisition is completed. Not surprisingly, closed plants tend to shrink and have poor pro￿tability prior
to their closure; we do not report the performance data for these plants. We partition our sample into
kept plants and sold o⁄ plants and analyze the changes for each sub-sample separately. We also analyze
the cross-sectional determinants of the performance changes within each sample.
6.1 Unconditional Changes in Performance
We examine changes in the performance of acquired plants over a four-year window, from t ￿ 1 to t + 3,
where t denotes the merger year. We measure performance by the post-merger changes in the operating
margins and productivity of the acquired plants.
Insert Table 6 here
Table 6 reports the data on post-acquisition performance of acquired plants. The upper panel reports
data for kept plants while the lower panel deals with sold plants. As discussed in Section 3.2, we employ
two measures of performance: the total factor productivity (TFP), which is reported in the ￿rst row of
each panel, and the adjusted operating margin, which is reported in the second row of a panel. Table 6
reports the TFP or margin level as of year -1 and the changes in these measures between year -1 and years
+1, +2, and +3.13
When we separate the acquired plants into those sold by the acquirer and those kept, we ￿nd striking
di⁄erences in performance between kept and sold plants.14 We ￿nd that on an unconditional basis, kept
plants tend to be strong performing prior to acquisition and these plants continue their strong performance
after the merger. For instance, the average change in TFP for kept plants over the three year window is
6.3% while the average change in margin is about 2.1% and both are signi￿cant at the 1% level. Sold
plants also have positive performance changes although these changes are less pronounced than changes
for kept plants. The average TFP change for sold plants is about 2.7% while the improvement in operating
margin is 0.7%, both signi￿cant at the 10% level.
The performance changes for sold plants are between one-half and one-third the corresponding changes
for plants kept by the acquirer. The evidence seems less consistent with the view that mergers are motivated
13Consistent with prior work, in this sample we ￿nd that combined (value-weighted) target-acquirer 3-day announcement
returns are slightly greater than zero (1.69% median return, 3.05% mean return), target returns are highly positive (13.5%
median return, 18.0% mean return), while acquirer returns are insigni￿cant but slightly negative.
14We also separately analyze plants that are closed between t and t + 3. As expected, plants that were closed plants tend
to shrink and have poor pro￿tability prior to their closure. We exclude closed plants from all subsequent analysis.
23by empire building and hubris and more in line with the view that acquirers keep the portions of the target
that they can improve operationally but tend to shed the assets in which they have no comparative
advantage in running. The asymmetry between the performance changes for kept and sold plants is
also inconsistent with Hypothesis 8c, the view that mergers resolve agency problems by liberating and
reallocating less productive assets trapped in targets unwilling to shed these assets.
6.2 Changes in Performance and Acquirer and Target Characteristics
The summary statistics in Table 6 re￿ ect unconditional changes in performance. We next present a cross-
sectional analysis of the performance changes as a function of the ex ante acquirer and target characteristics.
Our cross-sectional analysis adjusts for selection e⁄ects by employing a switching regression with en-
dogenous switching (Maddala (1983) or Li and Prabhala (2007)), which also allows us to estimate the
counterfactual performance changes if kept (sold) assets were sold (kept) instead. In the underlying choice
model, let VK;i be the latent value to an acquirer from keeping the plant i and VS;i the latent value from
selling plant i. We specify the latent functions as
VD;i = ZD;i￿D + ￿D;i (2)
where the decision to keep or sell is D"fK; Sg, ZD;i denotes observable explanatory variables and ￿D;i
denotes unobserved or private information about the value of the plant, given the decision D. We specify a
standard selection mechanism based on the limited dependent variable literature. An acquirer keeps asset
i if VK;i > VS;i and sells the asset otherwise. If a plant is kept, the change in productive e¢ ciency is ￿YK;i
and if it is sold, the change in productive e¢ ciency is a potentially di⁄erent function ￿YS;i. We specify
the change in productive e¢ ciency in each case as the regression system
￿YK;i = XK;i￿K + ￿K;i (3)
￿YS;i = XS;i￿S + ￿S;i (4)
In the system of equations (2) and (3)-(4), there are two possible outcomes for each acquired plant,
either it is kept or sold. However, we observe only one outcome, the actual outcome arising out the ￿rm￿ s
choice. We do not observe the counterfactual outcome. For instance, if a ￿rm keeps an acquired plant i,
we observe the fact that it kept the plant and the change in its productive e¢ ciency ￿YK;i but we do not
explicitly observe the productivity change which would have occurred had the ￿rm chosen to sell the plant,
￿YS;i. However, the counterfactual can be estimated, so we can determine whether the average e¢ ciency
of kept plants would be higher or lower if the kept plant were instead divested, based on the estimates of
system (2) and (3)-(4).
We estimate the switching regression system using a two step method. In step 1, we estimate the choice
24model implied by equation (2). The probit estimates are qualitatively similar to the estimates from the
multinomial coe¢ cient for the probability of selling a plant in Table 4. For brevity, we do not discuss
these results again. In step 2, the inverse Mills ratio is included in each of the equations (3) and (4) and
the regression coe¢ cients ￿K and ￿S are estimated. Tables 7 and 8 analyze the post-merger changes in
the operating margins and productivity of the acquired plants that are the retained by the acquirer and
those that the acquirer sells. We regress these changes on ex ante acquirer skill as well as target ex ante
variables, in addition to the inverse Mills ratio.15
Insert Table 7 here
Tables 7 reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the change in performance for
kept target plants. The change in performance is measured from the year prior to the merger to three
years after. Speci￿cations (1) and (2) in Table 8, the left columns, report the results when performance is
measured using TFP. The two columns to the right use operating margins as the measure of e¢ ciency. As
in Section 2, our dependent variable is the change in performance adjusted for the predictable portion of
performance changes.
From Table 7, the variable TMARG, the ex-ante pro￿tability of the target plant, has a negative
coe¢ cient. It is signi￿cant in three of the four speci￿cations, consistent with the view that underperforming
plants that are kept tend to improve more after mergers. The second variable, AMARG, denotes the
current (industry-adjusted) pro￿tability of acquirers. If above-industry margins re￿ ects acquirer skill,
more pro￿table acquirers should be more likely to improve future pro￿tability of plants that they elect to
keep. The evidence is supportive of this view. AMARG is signi￿cant and has a positive sign in Table 6
This is in contrast to the insigni￿cance of the AMARG in the decision to keep or sell a plant in Table 4.
This di⁄erence in coe¢ cients across the equations suggests that while an acquirer whose plants are more
pro￿table on average does not have an advantage in operating an average acquired plant, for those plants
for which there is a match between the acquirer￿ s skill and the target plant, so that VK;i > VS;i, higher
acquirer productivity leads to improved performance.
The third variable is ASKILL, or the skill of the acquirer in the peripheral divisions. We ￿nd that this
variable has a positive coe¢ cient and it is signi￿cant. Thus, ￿rms with relatively more expertise in running
their peripheral businesses tend to improve the productive e¢ ciency of the plants they keep. This ￿nding
is consistent with neoclassical theories of the ￿rm would suggest that ￿rms who are relatively skilled in
running their peripheral businesses should be more likely to make improvements in the plants they keep.
15While it is not our focus, we also examine the relation between merger announcement e⁄ects and disposal decisions and ex
ante ￿rm characteristics. Announcement e⁄ects are not signi￿cantly related to disposition decision or ex-ante characteristics
with two exceptions: a positive relation of target returns to target B/M, and a negative relation to industry operating margins.
The general absence of signi￿cance for acquirer and combined returns is perhaps not surprising given that announcement e⁄ects
also re￿ ect (in varying degrees) information revealed about acquirers￿own existing businesses, information about the level and
type of payment, and synergies (Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003)) plus any changes in administrative overheads.
25The ￿nding is not predicted by agency theories that suggest that plant acquisition and retention is an
outcome of agency-motivated empire building by ￿rms who spend cash generated by main divisions that
happen to be pro￿table.
Other variables in our speci￿cation include TRELSIZE, the size of the target relative to acquirer size,
following Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1991), who argue that gains are likely to be more concentrated in
relatively smaller acquisitions. We ￿nd little evidence for a size e⁄ect in explaining the gains in productive
e¢ ciency of kept plants. This suggests that the gains related to size reported in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback
may be attributable to economies of scale in reducing overheads rather than synergistic gains arising out
of manufacturing e¢ ciencies. In unreported results, we also used the number of plants acquired as an
alternative proxy for size; it was insigni￿cant and had little e⁄ect on the other coe¢ cients.
We include the acquired target￿ s book-to-market ratio, TBEME, as a control variable. Plants may have
unobserved future e¢ ciency gains not re￿ ected in current productivity levels. TBEME should capture this
e⁄ect, to the extent it is capitalized in target ￿rms￿share prices. There is no consistent pattern in the data.
In one speci￿cation (TFP, column 1), TBEME does have a negative sign and it is economically signi￿cant,
but the variable is not signi￿cant elsewhere.
We also include a dummy for the 1980s time period. This variable controls for the hypothesis that
target plant e¢ ciency gains may be a pure 1980s e⁄ect. Perhaps the deconglomeration wave of the 1980s
corrected ine¢ cient resource allocation in conglomerates formed in the 1960s and 1970s, while the 1990s
mergers are pure ￿nancial transactions caused by ￿rms exploiting overvalued stock. We ￿nd no support
for this view. There is mixed evidence on the signi￿cance of the 1980s dummy: it is signi￿cant in one
speci￿cation but not in the others. However, all coe¢ cients, including the signi￿cant one, are negative. If
the e¢ ciency gains are time period e⁄ects, they are more concentrated in the 1990s rather than the 1980s.
Thus, even if the 1990s merger wave are caused by ￿rms exploiting their overvalued stock as acquisition
currency, it is still the case that the acquisitions resulted in more productive e¢ ciency gains for the kept
plants.
For both the TFP speci￿cation and the operating margin speci￿cation, we report two speci￿cations that
incorporate acquirer-related stock market information. As before, the requirement that we have acquirer
data shrinks our sample. For instance, we have a sample of 4,239 plants in the TFP speci￿cations that do
not require acquirer data, but the sample is 2,356 plants when we impose the requirement that acquirer
stock market data is available. Interestingly, the acquirer BE/ME has a negative coe¢ cient. It is not
signi￿cant in the TFP speci￿cation but is signi￿cant at 1% in the operating margin speci￿cation. These
results show that low BE/ME acquirers, i.e., glamour acquirers, are able to achieve greater e¢ ciency gains
in the targets￿plants they keep. If acquisitions merely re￿ ect bidders using overvalued stock to pay for
targets, we would not necessarily see greater real e¢ ciency gains concentrated among glamour bidders.
Our view is that using overvalued stock as currency is probably not the whole story for why acquisitions
occur. While ￿rms do probably use their stock as currency for acquisitions, the systematic variation in the
26pieces they keep after such acquisitions also needs to be explained in such a theory.
The second acquirer stock market variable is DIAGONAL, which is equal to 1 if the BE/ME ratios
of the target and acquirer are similar. This variable is motivated by the observation in Rhodes-Kropf
and Robinson (2006) that mergers between similar BE/ME ￿rms have greater gains, perhaps because
the operating synergies between the ￿rms are greater. If so, Hypothesis 8a predicts that performance
changes of ￿rms would be greater in mergers of ￿rms with similar BE/ME ratios. We test this proposition.
Empirically, we specify a merger as a being a ￿diagonal￿merger if the absolute value of the di⁄erence in
BE/ME of the acquirer and that of the target is less than 1. We ￿nd no evidence that the economic gains
are more when the merger is between similar BE/ME ￿rms. In fact, the point estimate is negative and
signi￿cant at between 10% and 1%, suggesting that other variables are capturing the potential for synergies
between ￿rms. If such synergies exist in similar BE/ME mergers, the place to look for these is in the
administrative or headquarter level overheads of ￿rms rather than operating level e¢ ciency changes. It is
worth stressing that the results do not support the view that similar BE/ME acquisitions produce more
operating gains. However, our evidence certainly backs the more general proposition that complementary
assets produce greater operating gains.16
The selection term, the inverse Mills ratio, has a negative coe¢ cient in all speci￿cations. It is signi￿cant
at 10% in the TFP speci￿cations and at 1% in the operating margin speci￿cation for the full sample
but it is insigni￿cant in the smaller sample that requires acquirer stock market data. The inverse Mills
ratio variable is the expectation of the unobserved error term, or the private information, in the probit
speci￿cation modeling whether a plant is kept or sold. For the kept plant sample, the inverse Mills ratio
takes negative values because it is the expectation of the unobserved error given that a plant is kept given
that probit dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if the plant is kept. Thus, a negative coe¢ cient
for the inverse Mills ratio indicates that the unobserved private information that makes ￿rms more likely
to keep plants is positively related to the change in plant performance.
Insert Table 8 here
Table 8 reports the results for sold plants. Theories make no particular predictions about e¢ ciency
changes for the sold plants. Thus, it may not be surprising that sold plants show few of the patterns for
kept plants. A common element in both kept plants and sold plants is the negative sign for TMARG, the
prior performance of plants, which indicates that ex-post performance improvements are greater for plants
that have less strong performance ex-ante. Interestingly, the relative size of the target plant is negatively
related to changes in e¢ ciency, while target size is insigni￿cant in the kept equation. Thus, increases in
e¢ ciency in sold plants are concentrated in the subset of small plants sold o⁄ by acquirers.
16For instance, in our sample, skilled acquirers acquire good quality assets that tend to be related to their main businesses,
are more likely to retain them, and improve the productivity of retained assets.
27Interestingly, the 1980s dummy variable is insigni￿cant in the sold speci￿cation. If the 1980s mergers
were intended to undo agency-related ine¢ ciencies of large conglomerates, one might expect that the post-
merger sello⁄s in the 1980s should result in greater productive e¢ ciency gains for sold plants, a version
of hypothesis 8c. However, the coe¢ cient for 1980s is insigni￿cant, and in any case, the point estimate
is negative in all speci￿cations. Thus, we ￿nd no support for the view that the plants sold o⁄ during the
1980s deconglomeration wave became more e¢ cient in the hands of the new owners.
The results in Tables 7 and 8 can be used to construct estimates of the counterfactual changes in
productivity that would occur had the acquirer chosen to sell (keep) the plants that were kept (sold). From
equation (3), the counterfactual e¢ ciency gain if kept plants were sold equals ￿YK;i￿￿YS;i, whose expected
value is XK;i￿K ￿XS;i￿S. Likewise, the expected productivity sold plant were kept, its productivity would
be XS;i￿S ￿ XK;￿K. The results are interesting. For sold plants, the operating margin would be lower by
0.33% on average (t-statistic = 1.40) if the plant were kept instead of being sold. The results are quite
strong for plants that are kept. If the kept plants were sold instead, the average abnormal operating margin
would be lower by 2.57% (t-statistic = 18.0). The actual e¢ ciency is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent for sold plants
and much higher for plants that are kept relative to the e¢ ciency under the unchosen alternative.
Even after adjustment for selection and reversion to the mean in performance, our evidence suggests
that the post-merger asset retention/sale decisions lead to e¢ cient outcomes on average. Sold plants do
not demonstrably improve or deteriorate in performance. However, as predicted by Hypotheses 3, plants
that are retained by acquirers, which are e¢ cient to begin with as shown in Table 6, become even more
e¢ cient on average. We ￿nd e¢ ciency gains both in an absolute sense and relative to the counterfactual
e¢ ciency that would be realized had the plants been sold. Thus, even after adjustments for selection, our
is more consistent with a neoclassical view of ￿rm growth driven by comparative advantage rather than a
pure empire building motive for mergers.
6.3 Repeat Acquirers
This section considers an additional within-sample cross-sectional test to shed light on the empire building
motive for acquisitions. From an agency theory perspective, repeated acquisitions could be associated with
￿rms or managers with particularly strong tastes for empire-building (Hypothesis 8b). An alternative view
is that repeated acquisitions might lead to organizational learning and therefore superior outcomes in later
acquisitions as ￿rms become more skilled at post-merger restructuring, thereby making better decisions
about what target assets to keep or divest and how to improve the assets they keep. Matsusaka (2001) and
Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) present models in which conglomerate growth is driven by organizational
capability and learning about this capability over time.17
17A separate and now extensive literature studies announcement e⁄ects associated with repeat acquirers. Early papers
include Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), while more recent work includes Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Ahern (2007). See Ahern (2007) for an excellent overview of this literature.
28Insert Table 9 here
We include indicator variables for the subsequent acquisitions by a ￿rm. DEALNUM2 indicates plants
are part of a second acquisition by a ￿rm. DEALNUM3 indicates plants are part of a third acquisition by
a ￿rm and DEALNUM4 indicates plants are part of a fourth or higher acquisition by a ￿rm.
Table 9 examines the asset disposal decisions and the performance changes associated with acquisitions
by ￿rms that have already acquired other ￿rms previously. Panel A provides the multinomial logit estimates
for the plant keep, sale or closure decision for repeat acquirers. The logit speci￿cation is a full model that
includes the explanatory variables of Table 5 as controls (and obtain similar results) but to conserve space,
we report only the coe¢ cients related to repeat acquirers. These include DEALNUM2, DEALNUM3,
and DEALNUM4, which indicate plants that are transferred in the second, third, or fourth or higher
acquisitions by a ￿rm. Panel A shows that the coe¢ cients on the repeat deal variables for the closure
decision are not signi￿cant. Thus, one average repeat acquirers do not retain more of the target￿ s assets.
Target assets acquired in third or later deals are more likely to be sold o⁄. The marginal e⁄ects associated
with sell-o⁄ are economically signi￿cant: a plant acquired in the third or fourth deal of an acquisition
program is 10% more likely to be sold o⁄.
The performance results are reported in Panel B. Once again, to conserve space, we just report the
coe¢ cients estimates related to repeat acquirers and suppress the other results, which are similar to the
results in Tables 8 and 9. The results indicate that when repeat acquirers buy target plants, the target plant
performance for kept plants is relatively ￿ at in the second deal, worse in two out of the four speci￿cations
for the third deal with signi￿cance of between 5% and 10%, but improves signi￿cantly in the fourth
deal and beyond in all speci￿cations at 5% to 1% signi￿cance. Sold plants in later deals tend to show
positive performance improvements in most speci￿cations as indicated by positive signi￿cant coe¢ cients
for DEALNUM3 and DEALNUM4.
Overall, the productivity of the kept assets improves and that of the sold assets remains ￿ at for the
chosen decision relative to the counterfactual outcome, as in Tables 8 and 9. From an economic standpoint,
there is little evidence that serial acquisitions result in destructive allocation of real resources, contrary to
the predictions of Hypothesis 8b.
6.4 Acquirer￿ s Existing Assets
While the previous tests deal with the disposition of target plants after an acquisition, a related question is
how acquirers dispose of their own assets in the short period after a merger. We present some evidence on
this issue. We test whether acquirers treat their existing plants symmetrically with their newly acquired
plants or whether they have di⁄erent propensities to dispose of their own plants. Our tests control for the
other characteristics that drive plant disposal decisions.
29We combine all the target and acquirer plants in one speci￿cation. We then estimate one speci￿cation
with all common variables for acquirers and target and add an acquirer plant indicator variable that we
interact all common independent variables. Speci￿cally, we estimate a speci￿cation similar to the one we
estimate for targets in Table 5 for all plants incorporating acquirer interaction variables. In the interest
of space we just discuss these results here and do not report them.
In the (unreported) multinomial logit model for plant disposal, we ￿nd that the acquirer plant indicator
variable is insigni￿cant as are most of its interactions with the right-hand-side explanatory variables. Thus,
most of the di⁄erences between the sell o⁄ and closure decisions of acquirer and target plants can be
explained by di⁄erences in plant and ￿rm characteristics. The notable exceptions include negative signs on
acquirer skill variable and the industry operating margin both interacted with the acquirer plant indicator
variable. The negative signs indicate that skilled acquirers and acquirers in industries with high margins
are less likely to sell o⁄their plants than they are to sell plants those of the target. Acquirer skill continues
to matter in asset retention decisions.
We also examine the post-merger change in performances of acquirer￿ s plants existing plants. Theory
does not make strong predictions about the productivity of such plants. The increase in the scope of the
￿rm might decrease the productivity of existing plants. On the other hand, the restructuring (sales and
closures of ine¢ cient plants) following the merger might improve the match between the remaining plants
and the ￿rm￿ s core ability, leading to increases in productivity.
Insert Tables 10A and 10B here
Table 10A presents the results for the post-acquisition performance for plants owned by the acquirer
prior to the acquisition. As in Table 6 for target plants transferred in the acquisition, the upper panel
reports results for kept plants and the lower panel reports data for sold plants. In each panel, we report
results for the full sample and for the sub-sample of acquirers for which the book-to-market ratio is available.
As before, we employ two measures of performance: the total factor productivity (TFP), which is reported
in the ￿rst row of each panel, and the adjusted operating margin, which is reported in the second row of
a panel. These tables report the TFP or margin level as of year -1 and the changes in these measures
between year -1 and years +1, +2, and +3.
The unconditional averages show that kept plants exhibit strong performing prior to acquisition and
these plants continue their strong performance after the merger. For instance, the average change in TFP
for kept plants over the three year window is 6.9% while the average change in margin is about 1% and
both are signi￿cant at the 1% level. The evidence on the performance of sold plants shows a mixed pattern,
with some evidence of positive and negative changes depending on the horizon and measure of productive
e¢ ciency. The subsample of sold plants where acquirer BE/ME is available shows a notable decline in
operating margins across all horizons. The more signi￿cant and robust ￿nding from the table is, however,
the asymmetry between kept and sold plants. Kept plants tend to improve far more than sold plants,
30regardless of whether the plant was owned by the acquirer before acquisition or whether the plant was
obtained in the acquisition. The results partially explain the decline in acquirer￿ s plants that was found by
Schoar (2002), who analyzes the post-merger changes of all acquirer plants regardless of whether the plants
are kept or sold. If one looks just at the retained plants, there is no evidence to support the proposition
that the acquirer￿ s plants that are kept decrease in either productivity or operating performance.
In Table 11, we analyze the cross-sectional variation in performance changes for acquiring ￿rms￿existing
plants as we did in Tables 7 and 8 for plants purchased from the target. We regress the changes in
productivity and operating performance on acquiring ￿rm skill and size variables from the year before the
acquisition. As in the analysis for target plants, we also control for selection e⁄ects using the methods
described in Section 6.2.
Insert Table 11 here
Panel A of Table 11 presents the results for the acquiring ￿rms existing plants that are kept after the
merger. This panel shows that acquiring ￿rms with high ex ante margins and those acquirers that have
high skill are more likely to keep plants. In the last row we also show that the performance of these
kept plants less the performance had they chosen the counterfactual alternative of selling the plant. The
gain relative to the counterfactual is positive. This result is consistent with the acquiring ￿rm making an
optimal decision. Panel B of this table shows the results for existing plants sold by the acquirer. In
these cases, the acquiring ￿rm variables are generally insigni￿cant. We still ￿nd evidence consistent with
the acquiring ￿rm making optimal decisions for its existing plants that it sells. The the performance of
these sold plants is higher then in the counterfactual case in which these plants would have been kept.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that acquirers keep the portions of the target as well as
the portions of their existing plants that they can improve operationally but tend to shed the assets in which
they have no comparative advantage in running. The evidence seems less consistent with empire building
and lines up better with the theories of ￿rm growth that emphasize skill and comparative advantage.
7 Conclusions
We analyze the disposition and e¢ ciency changes of ￿rm plants involved in takeovers of manufacturing
￿rms in the US between 1981 and 2000. We ￿nd that extensive post-merger restructuring takes place.
Only just over one half of the acquired plants are retained by the acquirer for at least three years. Slightly
more than a quarter of the acquired plants are sold within this interval, and the remainder are closed down.
Plants in related transactions and plants that are in the target￿ s main division are less likely to be sold
whereas plants that are in the target￿ s peripheral divisions or are unrelated are signi￿cantly more likely to
be sold. The probability of a plant sale is also higher if market values have increased in the plant￿ s industry.
31Examining the existing plants of the acquirer, we ￿nd that they close and sell fewer of their own plants
than of the target￿ s plants. However these di⁄erences are driven by fundamental acquirer and plant level
characteristics. Controlling for these characteristics, acquiring ￿rms overall sell and close similar amounts
of their own plants as they do of plants they purchase.
Overall, the plants that are retained by the acquirers (both their own plants and the plants they
purchase) increase in productivity when benchmarked against industry plants, whereas the plants that are
sold do not. In addition, there is little evidence that repeat acquirers disposition decisions are less e¢ cient.
If anything, repeat acquirers sell a larger proportion of acquired plants. Moreover, the gain in retained
target plants￿productivity is particularly high for acquirers who do the largest number of deals.
These outcomes are not consistent with the notion that pure empire building by managers explains the
disposition of assets and the operating decisions following mergers. The outcomes are more consistent
with neoclassical comparative advantage view of ￿rm growth in Lucas (1978) and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2002). In particular, the skill of the acquirer at the margin is an important predictor of post-merger
restructuring. Acquirers with low skill in marginal businesses are more likely to sell. The average produc-
tivity of the acquirer￿ s plants does not predict disposal decisions. In addition, acquirers are more likely to
retain a plant if they are e¢ cient in the industry and the industry has experienced a positive shock. These
e⁄ects are economically signi￿cant. A further implication of the managerial scope based theory of the ￿rm
is that skill in operating peripheral divisions should matter more for the sello⁄ decision than the closure
decision. We ￿nd support for this hypothesis. The acquirer￿ s peripheral skill variable is not signi￿cant in
explaining the closure decision, which is largely driven by the pro￿tability of the unit being considered for
closure.
Our ￿ndings have broader implications. Given the magnitude of post-merger restructuring reported
here, mergers should not be viewed as a stopping point in de￿ning a ￿rm￿ s boundaries. Rather, each
merger should be viewed as an initial step that sets in motion a vigorous restructuring process that resets
the boundaries of the acquiring ￿rm. Moreover, the resetting of boundaries appears to follow economically
sensible principles. Firms tend to retain plants in which they have a comparative advantage and improve
their productivity but they tend to sell or close other plants. Thus, even if the initial decision to acquire a
target involves overpayment, empire building or simple hubris, our results indicate that economic rationality
asserts itself soon afterwards. Acquirers ￿nd it advantageous to enter into post-merger restructuring and
deals with other ￿rms that result, on average, in an improved allocation of resources following mergers.
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34Figure 1
Productivity of the acquirer￿ s marginal plant and the number of retained and
sold plants
35Figure 2
The e⁄ect of a positive shock on the productive acquirer
36Figure 3
The e⁄ect of a positive shock on a less productive acquirer
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Number of deals
Year # Deals SDC/Compustat Total # Deals






















Table 1 describes the number of merger transactions in our study. We obtain from the SDC M&A
database a sample of acquisitions in which the announcement date is between 1981 and 2000, the completion
date is within 180 days of the announcement, and the acquisition target is a domestic U.S. ￿rm with at
least one reported 4-digit SIC code from either SDC or COMPUSTAT between 2000 and 3999. Column 2
reports the number of transactions in the SDC Platinum that meet all criteria and match to Compustat.
Column 3 reports the number of these transactions that were able to be matched to the Longitudinal
Research Database maintained at the U.S. Department of Commerce. It includes 180 transactions that
were coded as outside manufacturing by SDC and Compustat but were also found to have manufacturing
assets.
38Table 2
Target and acquirer characteristics: Target data market value available
BE/ME Decile ME decile Adjusted Margin (%) De￿ated Shipments
Year Target Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target
1981 5.61 (5) 3.89 (2.5) 1.28 0.87 254,814 152,447
1982 5.07 (4) 3.60 (3) 2.46 1.02 178,348 76,465
1983 4.65 (4) 2.5 (1) 3.62 0.57 81,614 42,277
1984 4.98 (5) 2.72 (1) 0.22 2.57 326,670 114,538
1985 4.69 (4) 3.32 (2) 1.69 0.83 237,487 154,729
1986 4.58 (4) 3.18 (2) 2.38 2.22 170,048 95,584
1987 4.85(4) 2.73 (2) 3.21 0.98 293,416 85,519
1988 5.08 (5) 2.63 (2) 5.64 4.36 195,577 119,498
1989 4.38 (4) 3.05 (2) 2.93 -0.48 135,143 65,729
1990 5.18 (4) 3.02 (2) 0.69 7.80 418,129 163,169
1991 5.84 (6) 2.94 (1.5) 0.92 -2.38 422,266 155,766
1992 3.75 (3) 2.93 (2) 1.57 1.57 430,009 55,630
1993 5.09 (4) 2.50 (2) 7.65 0.29 511,955 91,724
1994 4.72 (3) 2.94 (2) 5.63 3.65 377,213 94,126
1995 4.42 (4) 3.02 (2) 4.64 1.40 160,551 64,866
1996 4.76 (4) 2.65 (1) 3.72 2.96 322,041 111,002
1997 4.88 (4) 2.90 (2) 5.17 3.72 524,207 152,392
1998 5.39 (5) 3.06 (2) 3.82 3.07 1,225,467 154,534
1999 5.12 (5) 3.58 (3) 4.65 4.04 2,718,597 146,281
2000 4.73 (4) 3.49 (3) 4.91 3.58 1,455,530 107,710
Table 2 reports the mean and median (in parentheses) of selected characteristics of acquirers and
targets. The sample consists of mergers from the SDC Platinum database in which the announcement date
is between 1981 and 2000, the completion date is within 180 days of the announcement, the acquisition
target is a domestic U.S. ￿rm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999, and
the target has matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The sample comprises ￿rms for which the market value of the target is available.
BE/ME decile and ME decile denote the book-to-market and NYSE market capitalization deciles to which
the target belongs based on year t ￿ 1 values. The adjusted margin is the actual operating margin of a
target plant minus the median margin for all plants that have the same 3-digit SIC code. The de￿ ated
shipments equals the value of shipments for a plant reported in the ASM adjusted for in￿ ation using the
SIC de￿ ator from the Bartelsman and Gray (1994) database.
39Table 3: Disposition of target and acquirer plants
# Plants # Total % Kept % Closed % Closed % Sold % Sold % Sold % Sold % Closed
in deal Bought Target Target Matched Target Target Matched Acquirer Acquirer
Industry (Partial) (Total) Industry (Total)
Full sample
1-5 1,954 56.59% 16.15% 2.40% 9.29% 27.20% 7.19% 14.17% 3.13%
6-10 1,193 53.76% 21.38% 4.23% 13.67% 24.86% 10.8% 12.51% 3.88%
11-25 2,316 54.69% 19.96% 4.57% 17.79% 25.35% 12.62% 14.12% 5.25%
26-50 3,337 56.57% 16.98% 5.19% 22.07% 26.45% 14.01% 18.49% 5.02%
￿ 51 4,093 51.76% 19.44% 5.18% 26.07% 28.80% 10.96% 16.08% 5.08%
Total 12,893 54.42% 18.58% 3.29% 19.99% 27.00% 8.98% 14.69% 4.02%
Transactions in 1980s
1-5 766 54.35% 20.35% 2.77% 9.64% 25.30% 8.82% 14.72% 2.60%
6-10 535 54.53% 25.24% 4.80% 13.10% 20.23% 12.6% 11.29% 3.07%
11-25 1,035 48.08% 24.24% 5.29% 22.86% 27.69% 14.41% 15.21% 5.73%
26-50 1,877 53.25% 16.85% 5.41% 22.33% 29.80% 16.65% 19.15% 5.36%
￿ 51 2,497 46.99% 17.89% 5.49% 30.71% 35.13% 12.82% 20.33% 5.40%
Total 6,710 50.33% 19.42% 3.71% 23.40% 30.25% 10.81% 15.57% 3.88%
Transactions in 1990s
1-5 1,188 58.15% 13.23% 2.07% 9.04% 25.61% 5.77% 13.76% 3.53%
6-10 658 53.06% 17.86% 3.71% 14.19% 29.08% 9.18% 13.67% 4.66%
11-25 1,281 60.30% 16.33% 3.90% 13.48% 23.36% 10.99% 13.14% 4.82%
26-50 1,460 61.12% 17.16% 4.99% 21.72% 21.72% 11.53% 17.82% 4.68%
￿ 51 1,596 59.48% 21.95% 4.92% 18.57% 18.57% 8.91% 12.36% 4.81%
Total 6,183 59.15% 17.61% 2.89% 16.04% 23.24% 7.33% 13.95% 4.14%
Relatedness
Related 4,080 54.78% 17.72% 14.12% 22.53%
Unrelated 8,813 51.02% 17.87% 21.51% 27.46%
This table reports the year +3 ownership status of plants, where the merger is completed in year 0.
Kept plants are still owned by the acquirer, sold plants are owned by a ￿rm other than the acquirer,
and closed plants are plants that shut down as of year +3. In each period, we classify the deals by the
number of target plants acquired for target disposition and by the number of acquirer plants for acquirer
disposition. 1980s transactions have a completion date between 1981 and 1989 and 1990s transactions
form the complementary set. Industry benchmarks for asset sales and closures are from industries that
experience a merger transaction in the same 3 digit SIC code and year. A target plant is related if it
belongs to the same 3-digit SIC code as a main division of the the acquirer.
40Table 4
Multinomial logit models for disposition of target plants
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Decision to sell plant
RELATED -0.53(-8.18)a -0.80(-8.73)a -0.81(-8.67)a -0.75(-7.93)a -0.73(-7.63)a
TMAIN -1.14(-19.79)a -0.91(-13.59)a -0.91(-13.69)a -0.95(-14.02)a -0.95(-13.94)a
TBEME 0.15(3.42)a 0.09(1.77)c 0.08(1.62) 0.10(2.03)b 0.09(1.81)c
TMARG -0.67(-6.00)a -0.76(-6.42)a -0.75(-6.22)a -0.78(-6.36)a -0.78(-6.4)a
AMARG -0.07(-0.24) -0.31(-0.98) -0.31(-1.00)
INDRET 0.19(2.37)b 0.20(2.54)b
ASKILL -0.94(-2.47)b -1.00(-2.59)b - 0.093 (-0.19)
ASKILL* INDRET -3.22(-3.05)a
IND R&D 3.69(2.83)a 3.53(2.7)a
SD (INDMARG) -0.55(-0.56) -. 563 (-0.57)
INDMARG 1.01(3.23)a 0.99(3.18)a
TRELSIZE 0.08(1. 54) 0.08(1.52) 0.06(1.24) 0.06(1.26)
LN (AOUTPUT) 0.06(2.45)b 0.05(2.37)b 0.05(2.16)b 0.05(2.18)b
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.66) 0.00(0.67) 0.00(0.8) 0.00(0.73)
1980s 0.28(4.54)a 0.27(4.45)a 0.32(5.07)a 0.32(4.98)a
Constant -0.17(-2.68)a -0.86(-2.79)a -0.82(-2.63)a -1.06(-2.91)a -1.07(-2.93)a
Dependent Variable: Decision to close plant
RELATED -0.32(-4.63)a -0.43(-4.24)a -0.43(-4.18)a -0.35(-3.33)a -0.35(-3.36)a
TMAIN -0.37(-6.58)a -0.46(-6.72)a -0.46(-6.77)a -0.49(-7.01)a -0.49(-7.02)a
TBEME 0.13(2.79)a -0.01(-0.22) -0.01(-0.22) 0.05(0.86) 0.04(0.85)
TMARG -0.69(-5.92)a -0.77(-6.27)a -0.79(-6.17)a -0.75(-5.87)a -0.75(-5.86)a
AMARG 0.12(0.39) -0.14(-0.46) -0.15(-0.49)
INDRET 0.06(0.67) 0.06 (0.7)
ASKILL -0.45(-1.17) -0.54(-1.4) -0.64(-1.42)
ASKILL* INDRET 0.19 (0.19)
IND R&D 4.86(3.72)a 4.88(3.73)a
SD (INDMARG) 2.55(2.4)b 2.55(2.4)b
INDMARG 1.10(3.37)a 1.09(3.33)a
TRELSIZE -0.12(-2.36)b -0.12(-2.38)b -0.12(-2.33)b -0.12(-2.3)b
LN (AOUTPUT) -0.14(-5.69)a -0.14(-5.76)a -0.13(-5.42)a -0.13(-5.4)a
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.66) 0.00(0.72) 0.00(1.23) 0.00(1.22)
1980s 0.35(5.39)a 0.34(5.36)a 0.43(6.44)a 0.43(6.45)a
Constant -0.76 (-10.74)a 1.21 (3.82)a 1.23 (3.88)a 0.16 (0.42) 0.17 (0.45)
N 8,164 8,164 8,164 8,026 8,026
Pseudo-R2 0.033 0.04 0.04 0.045 0.046
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 4 reports estimates of multinomial logit models with di⁄erent sets of explanatory variables. The
unit of observation is a plant acquired in a merger. We report estimates for the decision to sell (Panel A)
41or close (Panel A) a plant relative to the baseline decision to keep a plant by year +3 where the acquisition
is completed in year 0. RELATED is 1 if a target￿ s main business overlaps with an acquirer main division
and zero otherwise. TMAIN equals 1 if the plant￿ s output is at least 25% of the aggregate output of
all plants owned by the target and zero otherwise. TBEME is the target￿ s book-to-market ratio decile.
AMARG and TMARG denote the acquirer and target￿ s operating margins minus the median margin of all
plants in the 3-digit SIC, respectively. ASKILL denotes the average 3-digit SIC industry-adjusted margin
of all the plants owned by the acquirer outside its main divisions. IND R&D denotes the aggregate R &
D expenditure by all ￿rms in the 3-digit SIC code to which the plant belongs. INDRET is the (t, t + 2)
buy-and-hold return for the Fama-French 48-industry group to which the plant belongs. INDMARG and
SD(INDMARG) denote the median operating margin and the standard deviation of the operating margin
of all plants in the same 3-digit SIC code as the plant. TRELSIZE denotes the aggregate de￿ ated output
of all the plants owned by the target to the aggregate output of the acquirer. LN(AOUTPUT) denotes the
natural logarithm of the aggregate de￿ ated output of all plants owned by the acquirer. 1980s is 1 if the
merger was completed between 1981 and 1989 and zero otherwise.
42Table 5
Multinomial logit models for disposition of target plants: Marginal E⁄ects
Independent Variable Marginal E⁄ect on Sell Decision
RELATED -0.08(-6.80)a -0.13(-7.22)a -0.13(-7.17)a -0.13(-6.74)a -0.12(-6.46)a
TMAIN -0.17(-20.29)a -0.13(-13.03)a -0.13(-13.13)a -0.14(-13.46)a -0.14(-13.37)a
TBEME 0.02(2.87)a 0.01(1.91)c 0.01(1.75)c 0.02(1.9)c 0.01(1.67)c
TMARG -0.08(-4.71)a -0.10(-5.08)a -0.09(-4.89)a -0.10(-5.17)a -0.10(-5.21)a
AMARG -0.02(-0.34) -0.05(-0.91) -0.05(-0.93)
ASKILL -0.14(-2.3)b -0.15(-2.36)b 0.01(0.12)
INDRET 0.03(2.3)b 0.03(2.47)b
ASKILL* INDRET -0.55(-3.21)a
IND R&D 0.43(2.05)b 0.40(1.92)c
SD (INDMARG) -0.19(-1.21) -0.20(-1.22)
INDMARG 0.13(2.51)b 0.12(2.46)b
TRELSIZE 0.02(2.19)b 0.02(2.17)b 0.02(1.85)c 0.02(1.88)c
LN (AOUTPUT) 0.01(4)a 0.01(3.93)a 0.01(3.61)a 0.01(3.63)a
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.5) 0.00(0.5) 0.00(0.5) 0.00(0.44)
1980s 0.03(3.34)a 0.03(3.25)a 0.04(3.65)a 0.04(3.55)a
Independent variable Marginal E⁄ect on Close Decision
RELATED -0.03(-2.45)b -0.03(-1.68)c -0.03(-1.62) -0.02(-1.04) -0.02(-1.17)
TMAIN -0.01(-3.41)a -0.03(-3.46)a -0.03(-3.48)a -0.04(-3.69)a -0.04(-3.73)a
TBEME 0.01(2.00)b -0.01(-0.67) 0.00(-0.64) 0.00(0.38) 0.00(0.42)
TMARG -0.08(-4.61)a -0.09(-4.88)a -0.09(-4.85)a -0.08(-4.5)a -0.08(-4.48)a
AMARG 0.02(0.47) -0.01(-0.2) -0.01(-0.22)
ASKILL -0.03(-0.54) -0.04(-0.76) -0.09(-1.4)
INDRET 0.00(0.08) 0.00(0.07)
ASKILL* INDRET 0.16(1.11)
IND R&D 0.59(3.14)a 0.60(3.18)a
SD (INDMARG) 0.41(2.65)a 0.41(2.65)a
INDMARG 0.13(2.68)a 0.13(2.66)a
TRELSIZE -0.02(-2.89)a -0.02(-2.91)a -0.20(-2.78)a -0.02(-2.8)a
LN (AOUTPUT) -0.02(-6.57)a -0.02(-6.61)a -0.02(-6.21)a -0.02(-6.23)a
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.52) 0.00(0.58) 0.00(1.08) 0.00(1.09)
1980s 0.04(4.47)a 0.04(4.45)a 0.05(5.45)a 0.05(5.48)a
43Table 5 (continued)
Multinomial logit models for disposition: Marginal E⁄ects
Independent Variable Marginal E⁄ect on Keep Decision
RELATED 0.11 (7.90)a 0.16(8.02)a 0.16(7.96)a 0.14(7)a 0.14(6.81)a
TMAIN 0.18(17.82)a 0.16(13.48)a 0.17(13.58)a 0.17(13.99)a 0.17(13.94)a
TBEME -0.03(-3.83)a -0.01(-1.00) -0.01(-0.90) -0.18(-1.83)a -0.02(-1.67)c
TMARG 0.16(7.41)a 0.18(7.87)a 0.18(7.66)a 0.18(7.56)a 0.18(7.57)a
AMARG 0.00(-0.07) 0.05(0.93) 0.06(0.95)
ASKILL 0.17(2.3)b 0.19(2.52)b 0.08(0.92)
INDRET -0.03(-1.94)c -0.03(-2.07)b
ASKILL* INDRET 0.39(2.02)b
IND R&D -1.02(-3.98)a -1.00(-3.91)a
SD (INDMARG) -0.21(-1.07) -0.21(-1.07)
INDMARG -0.25(-4.09)a -0.25(-4.03)a
TRELSIZE 0.00(0.34) 0.00(0.37) 0.00(0.49) 0.00(0.49)
LN (AOUTPUT) 0.01(1.82)c 0.01(1.92)c 0.01(1.8)c 0.01(1.8)c
ANUMPLANT 0.00(-0.82) 0.00(-0.86) 0.00(-1.25) 0.00(-1.2)
1980s -0.07(-6.28)a -0.07(-6.2)a -0.09(-7.26)a -0.09(-7.2)a
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 5 reports the marginal e⁄ects associated with the multinomial logit estimates reported in Table
4. The unit of observation is a plant acquired in a merger. We report estimates for the decision to sell
(Panel A) or close (Panel A) a plant relative to the baseline decision to keep a plant before year +3 where
the merger is completed in year 0. RELATED is 1 if a target￿ s main business overlaps with an acquirer
division and zero otherwise. TMAIN equals 1 if the plant￿ s output is at least 25% of the aggregate output
of all plants owned by the target and zero otherwise. TBEME is the target￿ s book-to-market ratio decile.
TMARG denotes the target￿ s operating margin minus the median margin of all plants in its 3-digit SIC.
AMARG denotes a similar margin averaged across all plants of the acquirer. ASKILL denotes the average
3-digit SIC industry-adjusted margin of all the plants owned by the acquirer outside its main divisions.
IND R&D denotes the aggregate R & D expenditure by all ￿rms in the 3-digit SIC code to which the
plant belongs. INDRET is the (t, t + 2) buy-and-hold return for the Fama-French 48-industry group
to which the plant belongs. INDMARG and SD(INDMARG) denote the median operating margin and
the standard deviation of the operating margin of all plants in the same 3-digit SIC code as the plant.
TRELSIZE denotes the aggregate de￿ ated output of all the plants owned by the target divided by the
aggregate output of the acquirer. LN(AOUTPUT) denotes the natural logarithm of the aggregate de￿ ated
output of all plants owned by the acquirer. 1980s is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981 and 1989
and zero otherwise.
44Table 6
Changes in Performance After Acquisition
Kept Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
Statistic ￿￿1 ￿￿￿1;+1 ￿￿￿1;+2 ￿￿￿1;+3 ￿￿1 ￿￿￿1;+1 ￿￿￿1;+2 ￿￿￿1;+3
￿ = TFP 0.201 (19.70)a 0.063 (7.56)a 0.081(8.91)a 0.063 (6.61)a 0.21 (17.64)a 0.057 (5.76)a 0.094 (8.87)a 0.064 (5.31)a
6,348 6,346 6,346 6,346 4,452 4,452 4,452 4,452
￿ = Margin 0.032 (12.22)a 0.011 (5.34)a 0.011 (5.10)a 0.021 (9.24)a 0.036 (11.42)a 0.017 (6.75)a 0.012 (4.55)a 0.022 (7.94)a
6,409 6,409 6,409 6,409 4,452 4,452 4,452 4,452
Sold Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
￿ = TFP 0.047 (3.28)a 0.013 (1.05) 0.022 (1.60) 0.027 (1.87)c 0.055 (2.85)a 0.006 (0.34) 0.016 (0.87) 0.027 (1.45)
2,871 2,871 2,871 2,871 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
￿ = Margin 0.002 (0.63) -0.001 (-0.37) 0.003 (0.75) 0.007 (1.95)c -0.007 (-1.38) 0.002 (0.49) -0.003 (-0.57) -0.003 (-0.54)
2,905 2,905 2,905 2,905 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
t-statistics from test of signi￿cance of the average from zero in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 6 reports the average total factor productivity (TFP) and operating margin in year ￿1 and the changes in TFP between year ￿1 and
years +1, +2, and +3 for target plants acquired in mergers between 1981 and 2000 where the merger is completed in year 0. Acquired plants
are classi￿ed as kept if the acquirer retains ownership of plants as of year +3 and as sold if he plant was operating but not owned by the
acquirer as of year +3. We report statistics for two e¢ ciency measures ￿: (1) Operating margin, which is ratio of the operating income before
depreciation to the total plant shipments minus the industry median margin; (2) TFP, which is a plant￿ s log output minus the predicted
output based on a long-linear production function with squared and cross-product terms estimated for all plants in the industry. The sample
consists of mergers from the SDC M&A database announced between 1981 and 2000 and completed within 180 days of announcement, in
which the target is a domestic U.S. ￿rm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999 and has matching input/output
data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S. Department of Commerce. We report two sets of estimates, one for all
target plants and one for all target plants for which the acquirer￿ s book-to-market ratio is available in COMPUSTAT.
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Explaining changes in pro￿tability after acquisition: target kept plants
TFP Operating Margin
TMARG -0.047 (-0.79) -0.185 (-2.32)b -0.466 (34.12)a -0.503 (26.93)a
AMARG 0.531 (4.63)a 0.715 ( 4.34)a 0.217 (8.19)a 0.271 ( 6.95)a
ASKILL 0.473 (3.37)a 0.444 ( 2.95)a 0.108 (3.32)a 0.091 ( 2.53)b
TRELSIZE -0.010 (-1.14) -0.043 (-3.41)a 0.001 (0.30) -0.004 (-1.49)
TBEME -0.041 (-1.98)b -0.052 (-1.40) -0.003 (-0.57) 0.004 ( 0.44)
1980s -0.032 (-1.29) -0.054 (-1.51) -0.012 (-1.97)b -0.005 (-0.63)
ABEME -0.074 (-1.46) -0.045 (-3.67)a
DIAGONAL -0.131 (-4.08)a -0.013 (-1.67)c
￿ -0.119 (-1.64)c -0.165 (-1.72)c -0.049 (-2.86)a -0.028 (-1.21)
CONSTANT -0.011 (-0.27) -0.031 (-0.45) 0.004 (0.43) 0.015 ( 0.93)
N 4,239 2,356 4,452 2,475
F-statistic 7.67 (0.00) 9.12 (0.00) 194.91 (0.00) 94.57 (0.00)
￿ - Counterfactual ￿ 0.048 (17.30)a 0.027 (7.64)a 0.033 (11.63)a 0.03 (8.17)a
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 7 reports regression estimates in which the dependent variable is either the change in the total
factor productivity (TFP) or the change in operating margin for a plant between year ￿1 and year +3
where the acquisition completion is year 0. The sample used in Table 7 consists of all acquired plants kept
by the acquirer at the end of year 3. TMARG denotes the target￿ s operating margin minus the median
margin of all plants in the target plant￿ s 3-digit SIC. AMARG denotes a similar margin averaged across all
plants of the acquirer, while ASKILL is the same margin averaged over all the plants owned by the acquirer
outside its main divisions. TRELSIZE is the ratio of the aggregate de￿ ated output of all the plants owned
by the target to the aggregate de￿ ated output of the acquirer. TBEME is the decile to which a target￿ s
book-to-market ratio belongs. 1980s is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981 and 1989 and zero
otherwise. ABEME is the decile to which the acquirer￿ s book-to-market ratio belongs. DIAGONAL is 1
if the absolute value of the di⁄erence between the acquirer and target book-to-market ratio decile is less
than 1 and zero otherwise. ￿ is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model (estimates not reported to
conserve space) in which the dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if a plant is kept and the
independent variables are as in Table 4. The variable ￿ - Counterfactual ￿ is the average TFP (operating
margin) of the plants that were kept, minus the predicted TFP (operating margin) if the plants had been
sold o⁄.
46Table 8
Explaining changes in performance after acquisition: target sold plants
￿ = TFP ￿ = Operating Margin
TMARG -0.319 (-3.10)a -0.272 (-1.59) -0.612 (26.50)a -0.586 (15.60)a
AMARG -0.059 (-0.28) 0.127 (0.41) 0.004 ( 0.09) -0.119 (-1.65)c
ASKILL 0.276 (1.10) 0.175 (0.59) 0.099 ( 1.70)c 0.043 ( 0.62)
TRELSIZE -0.030 (-1.78)c -0.050 (-1.72)c -0.011 (-2.76)a -0.014 (-2.11)b
TBEME 0.003 (0.13) 0.135 (2.01)b -0.003 (-0.57) 0.012 ( 0.76)
1980s 0.002 (0.05) -0.102 (-1.30) 0.011 ( 1.09) -0.015 (-0.57)
ABEME 0.170 (1.45) -0.003 (-0.20)
DIAGONAL 0.150 (2.22)b 0.019 ( 1.05)
￿ -0.002 (-0.02) -0.084 (-0.73) 0.022 ( 1.26) 0.004 ( 0.16)
CONSTANT -0.084 (-0.68) -0.291 (-1.41) -0.056 (-1.94)b -0.061 (-1.27)
N 1451 670 1,530 707
F-statistic 2.19 (0.03) 2.12 (0.03) 112.93 (0.00) 33.13 (0.00)
￿ - Counterfactual ￿ 0.015 (1.72)c -0.006 (-1.55) 0.0048 (1.73)c -0.012 (-1.55)
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 8 reports regression estimates in which the dependent variable is either the change in the total
factor productivity (TFP) or the change in operating margin for a plant between year ￿1 and year +3
where the acquisition completion is year 0. The sample used in Table 8 consists of all acquired plants
that were sold o⁄ by the acquirer by the end of year 3. TMARG denotes the target￿ s operating margin
minus the median margin of all plants in the target plant￿ s 3-digit SIC. AMARG denotes a similar margin
averaged across all plants of the acquirer, while ASKILL is the same margin averaged over all the plants
owned by the acquirer outside its main divisions. TRELSIZE is the ratio of the aggregate de￿ ated output
of all the plants owned by the target to the aggregate de￿ ated output of the acquirer. TBEME is the decile
to which a target￿ s book-to-market ratio belongs. 1980s is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981
and 1989 and zero otherwise. ABEME is the decile to which the acquirer￿ s book-to-market ratio belongs.
DIAGONAL is 1 if the absolute value of the di⁄erence between the acquirer and target book-to-market
ratio decile is less than 1 and zero otherwise. ￿ is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model (estimates
not reported to conserve space) in which the dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if a plant
is kept and the independent variables are as in Table 5. The variable ￿ - Counterfactual ￿ is the average
TFP (or operating margin) of the plants that were sold, minus the predicted TFP (or operating margin)
if the plants had been kept.
47Table 9
Repeat Acquirers: Disposition and Performance Changes
Panel A: Logit Estimates: Target Plant Disposition
Decision to
Independent Variable Sell Plant Close Plant Keep Plant
Logit Coe¢ cients
DEALNUM2 0.07 (0.71) 0.01 (0.83)
DEALNUM3 0.55 (4.64)a 0.10 (4.26)a
DEALNUM4+ 0.55 (4.45)a 0.11 (4.26)a
Control Variables Yes, Variables from Table 5
Marginal E⁄ects
DEALNUM2 -0.04 (-0.43) -0.01 (-0.63) -0.003 (-0.21)
DEALNUM3 0.10 (4.26)a -0.02 (-0.90) -0.08 (-3.28)a
DEALNUM4 0.10 (4.26)a -0.03 (-1.87)c -0.07 (-2.83)a
Pseudo-R2 4.37%
N 7,953
Panel B: Target Plant Performance
Independent Variable ￿ = TFP ￿ = Operating Margin
Performance of Kept Plants
DEALNUM2 0.01 (0.23) 0.07 (1.56) 0.01 (1.34) 0.03 (3.02)
DEALNUM3 -0.12 (-2.17)b -0.10 (-1.61)c -0.02 (-1.35) -0.02 (-1.56)
DEALNUM4+ 0.15 (3.14)a 0.26 (3.74)a 0.03 (2.37)b 0.04 (2.61)b
Control Variables Yes, Table 8 speci￿cation
F-statistic 6.83 (0.00) 7.50 (0.00) 112.62 (0.00) 59.74 (0.00)
￿ - Counterfactual ￿ 0.05(4.43)a 0.07 (4.49)a 0.041 (3.53)a 0.03 (2.29)b
N 4,246 2,359 4,456 2,475
Performance of Sold Plants
DEALNUM2 0.048 (0.77) -0.05 (-0.53) -0.003 (-0.23) -0.01 (-0.45)
DEALNUM3 0.12 (1.63)c 0.10 (0.99) 0.04 (2.11) 0.05 (1.93)c
DEALNUM4+ 0.19 (2.21)b 0.27 (1.90)c 0.03 (1.40) 0.06 (1.93)c
Control Variables Yes, Table 9 speci￿cation
F-statistic 2.18 (0.02) 1.95 (0.03) 59.37 (0.00) 21.86 (0.00)
￿ - Counterfactual ￿ 0.009 (0.77) 0.015 (0.96) 0.009 (0.78) -0.01 (-0.94)
N 1,451 670 1,530 707
Panel A of Table 9 reports coe¢ cient estimates and marginal e⁄ects for a multinomial logit speci￿cation that
models the decision of the acquirer to sell or close a target plant relative to the baseline decision to keep the target
plant. DEAL2, DEAL3, and DEAL4+ are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the acquisition is the second,
third, or at least the fourth acquisition completed by an acquirer in our sample, and zero otherwise. The models
includes controls used in Table 4. Panel B reports estimates in which the dependent variable is either the change
in the total factor productivity (TFP) or the change in operating margin between year ￿1 and year +3; for a plant
owned by the acquirer prior to the merger. The variable ￿ - Counterfactual ￿ is the average TFP (operating margin)
of the plants for the chosen decision minus the unobserved predicted TFP (operating margin) for the unobserved
decision. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
48Table 10A
Changes in Performance of Acquirer￿ s Own Plants After Acquisition
Kept Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
Statistic ￿￿1 ￿￿￿1;+1 ￿￿￿1;+2 ￿￿￿1;+3 ￿￿1 ￿￿￿1;+1 ￿￿￿1;+2 ￿￿￿1;+3
￿ = TFP 0.17 (21.13)a 0.07 (8.25)a 0.078 (15.60)a 0.069 (11.50)a 0.17 (21.13)a 0.07 (10.29)a 0.08 (9.75)a 0.069 (8.63)a
15,290 15,290 15,290 15,290 9,362 9,362 9,362 9,362
￿ = Margin 0.036 (22.44)a 0.005 (3.13)a 0.008 (6.15)a 0.01 (6.67)a 0.035 (17.50)a 0.007 (4.12)a 0.011 (5.79)a 0.017 (8.63)a
15.426 15.426 15.426 15.426 9,398 9,398 9,398 9,398
Sold Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
￿ = TFP 0.059 (4.47)a 0.006 (0.46) 0.02 (1.48) 0.036 (2.73)a 0.07 (3.89)a -0.024 (-1.50) -0.01 (-0.56) 0.035 (1.80)
2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601
￿ = Margin 0.007 (2.00)b -0.008 (-2.85)a -0.005 (-1.52) -0.001 (-0.29) 0.01 (2.85)a -0.02 (-4.50)a -0.02 (-3.40)a -0.008 (-1.70)c
3,066 3,066 3,066 3,066 1,676 1,676 1,676 1,676
t-statistics from test of signi￿cance of the average from zero in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 10A reports the average total factor productivity (TFP) and operating margin in year ￿1 and the changes in TFP between year
￿1 and years +1, +2, and +3 for plants owned by ￿rms that make an acquisition and have matching book-to-market data are available
in COMPUSTAT. Year 0 denotes the merger completion year. A plant is classi￿ed as kept if it remains in the acquirer￿ s possession as of
year +3 and sold if it is operating but not under the acquirer￿ s ownership in year +3. We report statistics for two e¢ ciency measures ￿:
(1) Operating margin, which is ratio of the operating income before depreciation to the total plant shipments minus the industry median
margin; (2) TFP, which is a plant￿ s log output minus the predicted output based on a long-linear production function with squared and
cross-product terms estimated for all plants in the industry. The operating margins and TFP statistics in this table are regression-adjusted
for predictable time series changes.
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Changes in Performance Acquirer￿ s Own Plants After Acquisition
Kept Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
Statistic ￿￿1 ￿￿￿1;+1 ￿￿￿1;+2 ￿￿￿1;+3 ￿￿1 ￿￿￿1;+1 ￿￿￿1;+2 ￿￿￿1;+3
￿ = TFP 0.17 (21.13)a 0.014 (2.33)a 0.023 (3.29)a 0.017 (2.43)a 0.17 (21.13)a 0.019 (2.38)a 0.02 (2.63)a 0.017 (2.13)a
15,290 15,290 15,290 15,290 9,362 9,362 9,362 9,362
￿ = Margin 0.036 (22.44)a 0.002 (1.43) 0.004 (2.50)b 0.002 (1.17) 0.035 (17.50)a 0 (0.00) 0.002 (0.91) 0.005 (2.27)b
15,426 15,426 15,426 15,426 9,398 9,398 9,398 9,398
Sold Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
￿ = TFP 0.059 (4.47)a -0.003 (-0.002) 0.02 (1.32) 0.04 (2.44)b 0.07 (3.89)a -0.035 (-1.97)b -0.017 (-0.85) 0.029 (1.38)
2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601
￿ = Margin 0.007 (2.00)b -0.004 (-1.43) 0.00 (0.00) 0.005 (1.47) 0.01 (2.75)a -0.014 (-2.92)a -0.012 (-2.50)a -0.001 (-0.21)
3,066 3,066 3,066 3,066 1,676 1,676 1,676 1,676
t-statistics from test of signi￿cance of the average from zero in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 10B reports the average total factor productivity (TFP) and operating margin in year ￿1 and the changes in TFP between year
￿1 and years +1, +2, and +3 for plants owned by ￿rms that make an acquisition and have matching book-to-market data are available
in COMPUSTAT. Year 0 denotes the merger completion year. A plant is classi￿ed as kept if it remains in the acquirer￿ s possession as of
year +3 and sold if it is operating but not under the acquirer￿ s ownership in year +3. We report statistics for two e¢ ciency measures ￿:
(1) Operating margin, which is ratio of the operating income before depreciation to the total plant shipments minus the industry median
margin; (2) TFP, which is a plant￿ s log output minus the predicted output based on a long-linear production function with squared and
cross-product terms estimated for all plants in the industry. The operating margins and TFP statistics in this table are not adjusted for
predictable time series changes.
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Explaining changes in pro￿tability of acquirer￿ s plants after acquisition
Panel A: Kept Plants
TFP Operating Margin
AMARG 0.16 (4.87)a 0.09 (2.09)b 0.02 (3.02)a 0.00 (0.39)
ASKILL 0.17(2.05)b 0.12 (1.19) 0.12 (6.34)a 0.11 (4.55)a
TRELSIZE -0.01 (-2.25)b -0.01 (-1.56) 0.00 (1.29) 0.00 (1.28)
1980s 0.00 (0.67) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (-1.97) 0.00 (0.31)
DIAGONAL 0.01 (0.70) 0.01(2.02)b
￿ 0.14 (2.01)b 0.16 (1.78)c 0.06 (3.50)a 0.05 (2.49)a
CONSTANT 0.05(1.41) 0.05 (0.96) 0.04 (4.37)a 0.04 (3.37)a
N 12,026 6,578 12,667 6,901
F-statistic 10.64 (0.00) 3.20 (0.00) 15.16 (0.00) 6.48 (0.00)
￿ - Counterfactual ￿ 0.069a 0.112a 0.058a 0.068a
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Panel B: Sold Plants
￿ = TFP ￿ = Operating Margin
AMARG -0.08 (-1.00) -0.07 (-0.63) -0.08 (-4.74)a -0.08 (-3.04)a
ASKILL -0.14 (-1.05) -0.02 (-0.11) -0.02 ( -0.49) 0.00 (0.01)
TRELSIZE -0.01 (-0.58) -0.06 (-3.05)a 0.01 (0.18) -0.01 (-1.46)
1980s -0.03 (-1.04) -0.01 (-0.25) 0.00 ( 0.05) -0.01 (-0.51)
DIAGONAL 0.07 (1.71)c 0.01 ( 0.75)
￿ 0.03 (0.41) 0.03 (0.24) 0.04 ( 1.81)c 0.03 ( 0.12)
CONSTANT -0.01 (-0.07) -0.26 (-1.57) -0.04 (-1.57) -0.08 (-2.02)
N 2,569 1,153 2,700 1,200
F-statistic 0.86 (0.51) 2.52 (0.02) 5.04(0.00) 2.07 (0.01)
￿ - Counterfactual ￿ -0.001 -0.027a 0.003 0.0036
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
a = signi￿cant at 1%, b = signi￿cant at 5%, c = signi￿cant at 10%
Table 11 reports regression estimates in which the dependent variable is either the change in the total factor
productivity (TFP) or the change in operating margin for a plant already owned by the acquirer between year ￿1
and year +3 where the acquisition completion is year 0. Panel A contains all acquired plants kept by the acquirer at
the end of year 3. Panel B contains all acquired plants sold o⁄by the acquirer at the end of year 3. AMARG denotes
the acquirer￿ s operating margin minus the median margin of all plants in the target plant￿ s 3-digit SIC. TRELSIZE
is the ratio of the aggregate de￿ ated output of all the plants owned by the target to the aggregate de￿ ated output of
the acquirer. DIAGONAL is 1 if the absolute value of the di⁄erence between the acquirer and target book-to-market
ratio decile is less than 1 and zero otherwise. ￿ is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model (estimates not reported)
in which the dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if a plant is kept and the independent variables are
as in Table 4. The variable ￿ - Counterfactual ￿ is the average TFP (operating margin) of the plants for the chosen
decision minus the unobserved predicted TFP (operating margin) if the acquirer had chosen the alternative decision.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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